Leadership matters Prime Minister Koizumi's role in the normalization of Japan's post-9/11 security policy by Shrader, Donald L.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2008-12
Leadership matters Prime Minister Koizumi's role in
the normalization of Japan's post-9/11 security policy
Shrader, Donald L.













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
LEADERSHIP MATTERS: PRIME MINISTER KOIZUMI’S 









 Thesis Co-Advisors: Robert J. Weiner 
  Sophal Ear 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2008 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Leadership Matters: Prime Minister Koizumi’s Role in 
the Normalization of Japan’s Post-9/11 Security Policy 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Donald L. Shrader 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
For many years following the end of World War II, Japanese leaders followed the Yoshida Doctrine, which 
placed the nation’s priority on economic recovery and growth at the expense of defense spending.  Tokyo was able to 
do this through the U.S.-Japan alliance during the Cold War years.  The end of the Cold War and the “checkbook 
diplomacy” of the first Gulf War forced Japan’s leadership to rethink how it approaches foreign policy and marked 
the beginning of the end for the doctrine and a beginning to normalization of Japan’s security policy. 
It would take another ten years and another Gulf crisis before Japan would cross the threshold of deploying 
its armed forces overseas during wartime conditions for the first time since the end of the Pacific War.  Prime 
Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi was the leader who orchestrated this remarkable achievement to expand Japan’s security 
policy to better align Japan’s international contributions to its economic status as the second largest economy in the 
world.  This thesis will analyze Koizumi’s specific contributions to the normalization of Japan’s post-9/11 security 





15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
107 
14. SUBJECT TERMS Koizumi, Japan, Normalization, U.S.-Japan alliance, Constitution, Article 
Nine, Self Defense Force  

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
LEADERSHIP MATTERS: PRIME MINISTER KOIZUMI’S ROLE IN THE 
NORMALIZATION OF JAPAN’S POST-9/11 SECURITY POLICY 
 
Donald L. Shrader 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., San Diego State University, 2001 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 

























Harold A. Trinkunas, Ph.D. 
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs 
 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
For many years following the end of World War II, Japanese leaders followed the 
Yoshida Doctrine, which placed the nation’s priority and resources on economic recovery 
and growth at the expense of defense spending.  Tokyo was able to do this through the 
U.S.-Japan alliance during the Cold War years.  The end of the Cold War and the 
“checkbook diplomacy” of the first Gulf War forced Japan’s leadership to rethink how it 
approached foreign policy and marked the beginning of the end for the doctrine and a 
beginning of normalization of Japan’s security policy. 
It would take another ten years and another Gulf crisis before Japan would cross 
the threshold of deploying its armed forces overseas during wartime conditions for the 
first time since the end of the Pacific War.  Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi was the 
leader who orchestrated this remarkable achievement to expand Japan’s security policy to 
better align Japan’s international contributions to its economic status as the second largest 
economy in the world.  This thesis will analyze Koizumi’s specific contributions to the 
normalization of Japan’s post-9/11 security policy and discuss why it took his specific 
brand of leadership to allow Japan’s security policy to expand. 
 vi
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Prime Minister Jun’ichiro Koizumi1 of Japan, who served as premier from April 
2001 to September 2006, has been the subject of many studies.  He was the third longest 
serving postwar prime minister, in a post where the average length in office has been 
roughly two years.2  Only Prime Ministers Shigeru Yoshida and Eisaku Sato served 
longer in the position.  Prime Minister Koizumi was somewhat of an enigma in Japanese 
politics due to the fact that he was not the leader of his own faction (although there was 
precedence for this, it was certainly a rare occurrence) and exhibited an independent style 
of leadership by forming a cabinet largely of his own choosing, with little regard to 
factional loyalties and party politics.  This fact would play a significant role in how 
Koizumi ultimately ruled the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).  He quickly established a 
reputation as a strong and dependable ally to President George W. Bush in the global war 
on terrorism (GWOT) as well as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 
The basic research question that this thesis will ask is: “What specific actions did 
Prime Minister Koizumi take in the normalization of Japan with regard to security policy 
in the post-9/11 era and how much weight did his personal leadership carry in carrying 
out these actions?  Does individual leadership really matter in a country like Japan, where 
individual prime ministers are often thought to be overshadowed by powerful party 
power-brokers and entrenched bureaucratic policymakers?”  This thesis argues that the 
assertive actions that Japan took to normalize its defense/international security polices 
since 9/11, and, more specifically, its active support of the United States and the United 
Nations in carrying out GWOT and OIF, were largely due to the efforts of then-Prime 
 
 
                                                 
1 Japanese personal names will be presented in Western order; first name, last name. 
2  Naofumi Fujimura, "The Power Relationship between the Prime Minister and Ruling Party 
Legislators: The Postal Service Privatization Act of 2005 in Japan," Japanese Journal of Political Science 
8, no. 2 (Aug 2007), 245. 
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Minster Koizumi.  This thesis will provide evidence that Koizumi’s personal leadership 
carried the most weight in comparison to the other alternatives and that it can take the 
leadership of one man to force a shift in Japan’s foreign policy paradigm. 
In order to answer the basic research question, alternative arguments must be 
explored.  Were institutional reforms such as the strengthening of the kantei (the prime 
minister’s official residence and Japan’s version of the White House) the primary reason 
for Japan’s actions?  Or was it purely a result of situational factors like 9/11 and 
American pressure for Japan to respond?  Are the changes being driven by powerful 
bureaucrats in ministries like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) or the Ministry of 
Defense (MOD)? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
In recent years, there have been many studies conducted by scholars of Japanese 
politics and the U.S.-Japan security alliance on the “normalization” of Japan.  Although 
there are many ways to define normalization, these studies largely focused on what Japan 
has done in recent years to contribute to international affairs, both politically and 
economically, in a manner commensurate with its economic power.  For many years 
following Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War, Tokyo had followed the Yoshida Doctrine, 
named in honor of the first postwar foreign minister and third postwar prime minister, 
Shigeru Yoshida.  The doctrine basically focused Japan’s resources and efforts on 
economic growth at the expense of defense spending.  Japan was able to do this through 
its alliance with the United States.  In exchange for the use of military bases on Japanese 
soil, Washington agreed to provide defense for Tokyo and placed it under the American 
nuclear umbrella.  As a result of this arrangement, among other geopolitical factors such 
as the economic booms associated with the Vietnam and Korean conflicts and the 
opening of the American market to Japanese products, Japan experienced unprecedented 
economic growth leading to its current position as the second largest economy in the 
world. 
Despite the great prestige Japan enjoyed as a result of its economic prowess, 
Tokyo was largely seen as a political lightweight when it came to international affairs, 
especially on security issues.  This view was reinforced by Tokyo’s lack of assertive 
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actions during Operation Desert Storm in the first Gulf War.  Despite paying over 13 
billion U.S. dollars to support the coalition in its efforts to drive Saddam Hussein out of 
Kuwait, Japan failed to provide actual troops to support the operation.  Japan was heavily 
criticized by the international community for its “checkbook diplomacy” and failure to 
provide a human contribution to the efforts.3  Tokyo’s unwillingness to risk blood and 
treasure like the other coalition partners was largely seen as unacceptable for a nation 
with Japan’s economic stature.  When Japan finally deployed minesweepers to the 
Persian Gulf after the hostilities had ended, this action was largely seen as “too little, too 
late.”4  Even the Kuwaiti government failed to acknowledge Japan’s contributions when 
it took out a one-page ad in the New York Times to thank the coalition partners who 
assisted in driving Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.5 
For many years following the end of the Pacific War, Japan had been able to 
simply use its American-drafted Constitution, specifically Article Nine, as an excuse for 
not participating in any action that required the use of its armed forces, known as the Self 
Defense Forces (SDF) or jieitai.  Article Nine is the so-called peace clause that forbids 
Japan from using military force as a means to settle international disputes.  Prime 
Minister Yoshida and subsequent prime ministers used Article Nine as a tool to focus on 
economic issues rather than security issues.  This was the foundation of the Yoshida 
Doctrine.6  However, the ridicule that Tokyo suffered in the aftermath of Operation 
Desert Storm demonstrated that checkbook diplomacy was no longer an acceptable 
foreign policy option for Japan in the post-Cold War era. 
Prime Minister Koizumi was inaugurated as prime minister in April 2001.  Five 
months later, the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. occurred.  
Before long, the United States would launch attacks against the Taliban in Afghanistan.  
By 2003, the United States, along with a new coalition, would be at war with Iraq.  How 
                                                 
3  Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan : Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2007), 67. 
4  Tomohito Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy : Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 51. 
5  Ibid., 55. 
6  Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising : The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose, 1st ed. (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2007), 241-277. 
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would Japan react to this new crisis?  Would it revert to the use of checkbook diplomacy 
as it had during the first Gulf War?  Would it attempt to participate but take too long to 
make a decision and miss out on the opportunity to show the world that it can contribute 
to international security issues with more than just money?  Or would Japan rise to the 
occasion and take decisive action in support of GWOT and OIF by providing actual 
“boots on the ground”? 
Japan obviously chose the latter option.  Prime Minister Koizumi provided the 
much-needed strong leadership to steer Japan on the right course with regard to the post-
9/11 security policy.  Under his leadership, the Diet quickly passed laws that enabled the 
Maritime SDF (MSDF) to provide fuel and ammunition to allied warships in the Indian 
Ocean and send the Ground SDF (GSDF) to a war zone for the first time since the end of 
the Pacific War. 
Why did Japan choose this option?  Although there is little doubt as to the 
importance of Japan’s normalization from both the American and Japanese perspectives, 
it is crucial to understand who or what is driving these changes.  It is important to 
understand this because it will help U.S.-Japan alliance scholars and policymakers have 
an idea of what kind of behavior to expect from Japan in the future.  Will Japan be an ally 
that the United States can count on in future crisis on a consistent and regular basis or 
will its support from Japan come intermittently based on who its leader is?  U.S.-Japan 
alliance policymakers must understand that the future trajectory of Japan’s security 
policy does indeed depend a great deal on Japan’s leader.  It is the intent of this thesis to 
provide evidence that Koizumi’s personal actions drove these changes.  While the 
arguments in favor of institutional, bureaucratic and situational reasons have their valid 
points, these factors did not drive the prime minister’s decisions and actions.  Rather, he 
skillfully manipulated and used these alternative factors to his fullest advantage to 
accomplish his foreign policy objectives.  This thesis will demonstrate that it took 





military support to the coalition to protect Japan’s delicate credibility in international 
affairs.  A typical Japanese politician who is unwilling to take risk and would rather build 
consensus before acting would not do.  In short, it took “Koizumi Magic.”7 
 The continued normalization of Japan’s security policy will clearly strengthen the 
alliance between Japan and the United States.  Having the ability to utilize the SDF in a 
manner commensurate with Japan’s economic power will provide greater flexibility and 
more options for the political leadership of Japan.  However, the issue of whether 
collective self defense is permissible or not under the constitution continues to be a major 
sticking point within the U.S.-Japan alliance.  The Japanese government believes that 
collective self defense is a right of any sovereign nation.  However, the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau’s (CLB) official position is that under Article Nine, Japan may not 
practice collective self defense.8  The CLB is neither an elected group of politicians nor a 
group of justices like the Supreme Court.  Rather, the CLB is a group of powerful 
bureaucrats who make foreign policy by defining “war potential” as well as ruling 
collective self defense unconstitutional.9  This is a major problem from the perspective of 
war fighters on both sides of the alliance and perhaps the most direct example of 
bureaucratic influence over foreign policymaking and an example of one of several 
obstacles that Japan must confront in order to take normalization to the next step. 
C. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis will utilize both a historical and case study method.  The initial goal is 
to establish the historical context of normalization to thoroughly understand what it is, 
why Japan is normalizing its security policy, and some of the constraints associated with 
it.  In order to accomplish this, historical study of the Japanese postwar constitution as 
well as the Yoshida Doctrine, which has guided Japan’s postwar foreign policy for so 
many years, is necessary.  Arguably, these two items are among the biggest obstacles to 
Japan’s present day normalization efforts.  When available, primary sources such as the 
1947 Constitution will be referred to.  Other primary sources, such as articles written by 
                                                 
7 Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy : Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs, 7. 
8  Samuels, Securing Japan : Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, 46-51. 
9  Ibid., 46. 
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political leaders such as former Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa10 and opposition 
Leader and former LDP power-broker Ichiro Ozawa,11 as well as speeches of various 
prime ministers, will be analyzed to determine any trends or changes with regard to 
foreign policy. 
Additionally, this thesis will study the position of the prime minister and the 
reforms that were implemented to strengthen the kantei.  This is necessary to determine 
how much influence institutional reforms had on Koizumi’s tenure.  This section will 
briefly compare the Japanese prime minister to some of his counterparts in other political 
systems in order to analyze how much power he has relative to other leaders, and how 
this affects his ability to influence foreign affairs.  This thesis will also study political 
leadership in general and determine if Koizumi exhibited some of the common traits 
associated with successful political leaders. 
This thesis will also study the role of the bureaucracy and its influence in 
directing foreign policy.  How much influence does it have on elected officials?  Is there 
a power struggle between bureaucrats and politicians?  If so, is it a zero sum game where 
one side’s power increases or decreases at the expense of the other?  This will be 
necessary to eliminate the argument that the bureaucracy really drives Japanese foreign 
policy. 
A case study method will be utilized to study Koizumi’s domestic reforms, 
specifically the actions that he took to pass postal reforms.  This case study will also 
determine how much influence bureaucratic and institutional factors exerted in Koizumi’s 
successful postal reform.  Studying Koizumi’s domestic success is important to identify 
whether there is a link between success in domestic politics and success in foreign affairs.  
Does leadership in one require a different type of leadership in the other or do the skills 
for both go hand in hand?  Election result data and public opinion polls will be analyzed 
as applicable. 
                                                 
10  Morihiro Hosokawa, "Are U.S. Troops in Japan Needed?" Foreign Affairs 77, no. 4 
(07//Jul/Aug98, 1998), 2-5. 
11  Ichirō Ozawa, Louisa Rubinfien and Eric Gower, Blueprint for a New Japan : The Rethinking of a 
Nation [Nihon kaizō keikaku.], 1st ed. (Tokyo ; New York; New York: Kodansha International; Distributed 
in the U.S. by Kodansha America, 1994), 208. 
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Since the fiasco of the first Gulf War was considered by many to be the catalyst 
that drove Japan to reconsider its foreign policy toward taking on a more assertive role in 
international affairs, a case study of how Prime Minister Kaifu managed the first Gulf 
War crisis will be necessary to determine the lessons learned and to establish a baseline 
to compare what Koizumi did differently during post-9/11 and the second Gulf War.  Did 
Kaifu perform poorly because he was less of a leader than Koizumi, or were there other 
factors involved?  Was there a link between his attempts to reform domestically and his 
performance in foreign affairs?  Did the structural reforms that took place since 1991 
such as the 1994 electoral reform12 and the 1999 cabinet reform really stack the deck in 
Koizumi’s favor or were these reforms overrated?  These are some of the questions that 
can be addressed with a case study of the first Gulf War and how Kaifu handled his 
responsibilities.  Studying this case will allow this thesis to eliminate institutional reasons 
as the main distinction between Koizumi and Kaifu’s leadership. 
The thesis will then focus on Koizumi’s specific contributions to the 
normalization of Japan’s security policy.  An area of particular concern is Koizumi’s 
influence on the expanding role of the SDF, particularly the laws passed by the Diet, such 
as the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) to support GWOT and the Iraq 
Special Measures Legislation (ISML) to send ground troops to Iraq.  The goal is to study 
why Koizumi was able to pass this through the Diet so quickly despite the lack of support 
from within the LDP and the opposition. 
Since Koizumi’s departure from office in 2006, three men have held the position 
of prime minister.  Shinzo Abe was Koizumi’s immediate successor and was in the job 
less than one year before resigning to take responsibility for the LDP’s loss in the upper 
house election.  Yasuo Fukuda replaced Abe in 2007 but also stepped down with less 
than one year in office.  Both men served in Koizumi’s cabinet as Chief Cabinet 
Secretary, a powerful position roughly equivalent to the White House Chief of Staff 
within the United States government.  The third post-Koizumi prime minister is the 
 
                                                 
12 Margarita Estévez-Abe, "Japan's Shift Toward a Westminster System: A Structural Analysis of the 
2005 Lower House Election and its Aftermath." Asian Survey 46, no. 4 (Jul/Aug, 2006): 642. 
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incumbent, Taro Aso, who took over the position in September 2008.  The importance of 
Koizumi’s role in shaping of Japan’s post- 9/11 security policy cannot be thoroughly 
analyzed without asking whether his successors have been able to maintain momentum 
with regard to these issues.  In short, have Koizumi’s reforms endured?  Have these men 
demonstrated strong leadership as a result of the new and improved kantei?  An analysis 
of Koizumi’s successors’ performance will demonstrate that institutional reasons alone 
will not make the position of prime minister stronger or more effective. 
The literature reviewed for this thesis provides a solid background on the various 
arguments that claim to be the driving factors in the post-9/11 security policy.  Ever since 
Japan regained its independence in 1952 upon the conclusion of the American 
occupation, U.S.-Japan alliance policymakers and scholars who lived through the 
Yoshida Doctrine years and the Gulf War fiasco have not believed that Japan would ever 
deploy the SDF out of Japan during wartime conditions.  When this barrier was finally 
breached with the deployment of the SDF to the Indian Ocean and Iraq, the same scholars 
and policymakers gave credit to the reforms that strengthened the kantei rather than to the 
leader who actually pulled the trigger to make this happen.  It is the intent of this thesis to 
demonstrate that although these arguments are certainly important factors and had a part 
in the normalization of Japan’s post-9/11 security policy, they were not driving the 
policy.  Rather, this thesis argues that Koizumi was driving the policy.  A simple analogy 
can be used to demonstrate this point.  An automobile represents Japan’s post-9/11 
security policy.  Someone (a leader) must drive the policy.  The automobile engine 
represents the bureaucracy.  A strong, well-maintained engine will help the driver arrive 
at his destination (the direction in which the policy is driven; in this case, the path of 
normalization).  On the same note, a poorly maintained, weak engine could hinder the 
goal of arriving safely at the destination (For example, the CLB’s interpretation that 
collective self defense is not permissible under the constitution).  A state’s rules of the 
road and infrastructure such as well-maintained roads and signal lights represents 
institutional factors such as the new and improved kantei and electoral reform.  Improper 
functioning of the infrastructure and rules could lead to accidents.  On the other hand, 
properly functioning rules and traffic lights will help the driver reach his destination.  The 
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weather/driving conditions represent situational factors like the first Gulf Crisis and 9/11.  
A storm can be viewed as both an obstacle and an opportunity.  An average driver may 
view it as an obstacle and decide to wait out the storm (slow response) or attempt to drive 
through it and end up in an accident (bad response).  This example would characterize 
Kaifu in Gulf War One.  On the other hand, a good driver may view it as an opportunity 
to drive through the storm quickly to avoid the traffic (quick, decisive response) or view 
it as an opportunity to show his superior driving skills in challenging conditions (superior 
political prowess).  This characterizes Koizumi’s actions both domestically and 
internationally since 9/11.  The point of this analogy is that although all factors have a 
role in getting the car from point A to point B, it takes a skillful driver to operate the car, 
ensure it is properly maintained, and make decisions regarding navigation.  In other 
words, bureaucratic, situational, and institutional factors all play a role in post-9/11 
normalization, but Prime Minister Koizumi was without question the driving factor.  He 
was able to do this because of his popularity (which translates to political capital), his 
superior use of the media (newspapers, sports shimbun, wide shows, internet), his 
commitment (whether to personal vision such as postal reform or loyalty to an alliance 
partner like the United States), and his willingness to take risks to do what he believes is 
right for Japan. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
 This thesis will consist of five chapters, including this introductory chapter. 
Chapter II will provide brief history/background to establish the historical context 
of normalization and will include discussions on the postwar constitution, the Yoshida 
Doctrine and the constraints associated with normalization.  It will also discuss the 
position of prime minister and how the kantei has changed since the Cabinet reform of 
1999 and its impact on Koizumi’s tenure as prime minister.  The section will also cover 
general leadership qualities necessary for success within Japanese politics and Koizumi-
specific leadership skills that helped him navigate through over five years of stability in a 
highly unstable environment that is Japanese party politics.  This chapter will also include 
a discussion on bureaucratic power, especially the CLB, as it relates to policy making. 
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Chapter III will provide arguments for and against Koizumi’s leadership.  The 
first part will focus on the argument in favor of Koizumi’s leadership and will discuss 
Koizumi’s foreign/security policy and the actions that he specifically took after 9/11 to 
normalize Japan’s security policy.  The second section will introduce alternative 
arguments and will focus on bureaucratic, institutional and situational reasons as the 
driving factors in Japan’s normalization since 2001. 
Chapter IV will consist of case studies.  The first will discuss Prime Minister 
Kaifu during the first Gulf War and will attempt to link Kaifu’s failure in domestic policy 
with his failure in foreign policy.  This case will also be used to determine how much of 
an impact bureaucratic, institutional, and situational factors played in the relatively poor 
performance of Prime Minister Kaifu.  The second case study will be on Koizumi’s 
domestic reform, specifically with postal reform.  As with Kaifu’s case, the same factors 
will be analyzed to determine their influence on Koizumi’s success with postal reform.  
This study will attempt to link Koizumi’s success in domestic politics with his success in 
foreign policy.  Finally, post-Koizumi prime ministers will be analyzed to determine 
whether reforms to the electoral system and the kantei have resulted in stronger 
leadership from the office of prime minister. 
Chapter V will conclude.  It will provide the author’s views on whether we can 
expect to see more strong and assertive leaders like Koizumi who will continue to take 
normalization of Japan one step further and how this will impact the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
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II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution:  Aspiring sincerely to an 
international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people 
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or 
use of force as means of settling international disputes.  
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and 
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The 
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.13 
A. BRIEF HISTORY AND ORIGIN OF THE U.S.-JAPAN ALLIANCE 
There are two main factors that have driven Japanese foreign policy since the end 
of the Pacific War.  One is Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution, quoted above, and 
the other is the Yoshida Doctrine.  In order to understand the U.S.-Japan alliance in 
general and especially in the context of normalization, one must have a firm grasp of 
these two concepts.  Article Nine is the peace clause built into the constitution that 
renounces the use of force as a means of settling international disputes.  The Yoshida 
Doctrine, named in honor of Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, describes the doctrine of 
placing economic recovery of Japan as the main goal of the government at the expense of 
defense related spending.  The following paragraphs will provide a brief history and 
explanation of the article and doctrine. 
1. Postwar Constitution 
General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), 
along with then-Prime Minister Shidehara, rewrote Japan’s constitution and the process 
began as a draft submitted by the prime minister to the SCAP in February of 1946.  This 
draft was by and large, just a revision of the Meiji version, with some minor changes to 
prevent future abuses of the constitution through amendments, and was presumably a 
major contributor to the military gaining power and General Tojo’s eventual rise to the 
position of prime minister, which directly led to Japan embarking on its’ path of 
                                                 
13 Japan Constitution, art. 9. 
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destruction.  According to Jim Auer, a leading expert on the U.S.-Japan security alliance, 
there is some dispute over the actual origin of Article Nine.  MacArthur stated in his 
memoirs that Shidehara suggested it to him, and MacArthur agreed that it was an 
excellent idea, but Yoshida Shigeru, then foreign minister and future prime minister, 
believed that MacArthur suggested it and Shidehara agreed.14  In any case, the clause was 
included and submitted to House of Representatives in July 1946.  When the constitution 
became effective on May 3, 1947, Japan’s war-weary citizens did not want anything 
resembling the Imperial Army or Navy for their country, even for self defense, although 
the language of the article was specifically drafted in a way to allow for the buildup of 
armed forces for self-defense purposes.15  MacArthur also wrote in his memoirs that 
although he agreed with the wording of the peace clause, it was never his intention that 
Japan not be allowed to defend itself from attack.16  Article Nine quickly became an issue 
in 1950 at the outbreak of the Korean War.  MacArthur wanted Prime Minister Yoshida 
to develop a 75,000-man National Police Reserve (NPR),17 the direct predecessor of the 
SDF, as a means to maintain internal security in Japan when the U.S. military ended its 
occupation and began to shift its focus to the Korean peninsula.  Clearly, U.S. interest in 
the development of the NPR and eventual rearming of Japan was to develop a strong ally 
in containing communism and to resist the Soviet Union, not just to defend Japan proper.  
It was clear as early as 1950 that the peace clause would create unplanned problems for 
the U.S. strategy in the Far East.  The NPR eventually became the National Safety Forces 
(NSF) in 1952 with a ground and maritime element.  Finally, in 1954, with the 
establishment of the Defense Agency Establishment Law, the SDF was formed with a 
ground, maritime and air component. 
 
                                                 
14  James E. Auer, "Article Nine of Japan's Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force 
"Forever" to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World," Law and Contemporary Problems 53, no. 2, 
The Constitution of Japan: The Fifth Decade: [Part 2] (Spring, 1990), 173. 
15  Ibid., 175. 
16  Ibid., 173. 
17  Samuels, Securing Japan : Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, 46. 
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The point of this brief history is twofold.  First, the ambiguity in the origins of the 
peace clause suggests that from the American perspective, MacArthur wanted Shidehara 
to take credit so that the Japanese people would take ownership of their new status as a 
peaceful democracy and not use the fact that it was an American invention as an excuse 
for not supporting it.  From the Japanese perspective, Yoshida clearly intended to use the 
American authorship of the constitution to implement the Yoshida Doctrine and focus 
fully on economic recovery, and to leave defense to the United States.  And finally, the 
old adage of “be careful of what you wish for because it might come true” became a 
reality for MacArthur, because when he needed a strong ally in East Asia to support his 
war efforts on the Korean Peninsula, it was no easy task to convince Japan to build up the 
SDF, arguably the first step for normalization of the Japan’s security policy, and to take 
more responsibility for its own defense.  Furthermore, Japan has no experience revising 
its constitution, even the Meiji Constitution.  Thus, the historical aspects of how and why 
the peace clause was included are important factors in determining how much any prime 
minister, including Koizumi, can accomplish in terms of normalization of Japan’s 
security policy, whether revision or reinterpretation is feasible, and just how challenging 
this is in domestic politics. 
2. Yoshida Doctrine 
The idea of the Yoshida Doctrine survived for many years, was the dominant 
school of thought with Japanese foreign policy makers, and had a direct impact on the 
U.S.-Japan alliance throughout the Cold War years.  It essentially placed the Japanese in 
a free riding, bandwagoning alliance with the United States that was simultaneously used 
to balance against the Communist threat from the Soviet Union and China.  Throughout 
the Cold War years, this was a win-win situation for both Japan and the United States.  
Washington gained an ally in the fight against communism as well as real estate 




World War, when American foreign policy was based on Kennan18 and Nitze’s19 strategy 
of containment.  Japan clearly had the potential to become strong militarily and 
economically, and it was important from Washington’s perspective that the alliance that 
would eventually become the linchpin for American foreign policy in Asia was anchored 
by a nation friendly to the United States and shared the same basic principles, such as 
democracy and a capitalist economic system.  Additionally, Japan’s valuable strategic 
location made it an especially attractive location at which to base American troops.  After 
the devastating defeat in the Second World War, many Japanese placed the blame of 
suffering, both Japanese citizens as well as the victims of Japanese aggression, squarely 
on the shoulders of the Imperial Army.20  As a result, the Japanese public’s trust in the 
military was non-existent.  Prime Minister Yoshida would use this sentiment to his 
advantage to focus on spending every available yen to rebuild the economy and leave the 
defense of Japan to the United States. 
The Yoshida Doctrine proved successful for many decades beyond the end of the 
war and the regaining of Japanese sovereignty.  One could argue that Japan’s rise to the 
second largest economy in the world with virtually no natural resources was due largely 
to the doctrine.  It took the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the 
first Gulf War fiasco to show the leaders of Japan that the doctrine was no longer 
applicable.  Now that Japan had become an economic superpower, the nation would have 
to learn to participate in a world where it must balance conflicting gaiatsu (foreign 
pressure) from the United States to do more in security issues and to use extreme caution 
toward the rest of Asia in deploying the SDF overseas.  The historical aspects of how and 
why the peace clause was included and the foundation of the Yoshida Doctrine are 
important factors in analyzing the shaping of the alliance throughout the stages of 
postwar, Cold War and post-Cold War years. 
                                                 
18 X., "The Sources of Soviet Conduct." Foreign Affairs (Pre-1986) 25, no. 000004 (Jul 1947), 566. 
19  National Security Council (U.S.) and others, NSC-68 : Forging the Strategy of Containment 
(Washington, DC: National Defense University : For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 1994), 137. 
20  John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat : Japan in the Wake of World War II. 1st ed. New York: W.W. 
Norton & Co., 1999, 58. 
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Many U.S.-Japan alliance policymakers and scholars have argued that the 
doctrine has created a Japan that has become a reactive state.21  In other words, Japanese 
foreign policy simply consists of the government reacting to gaiatsu from the West or 
from Asia like a feather being blown about by the wind.  Others further argue that Japan 
does not have a foreign policy of its own but rather simply follows American foreign 
policy. This sentiment was evidenced by many political cartoons, even during the 
Koizumi-era, depicting the prime minister as simply a tool or an extension of American 
foreign policy.22   These characterizations were clearly unfair.  Koizumi took actions he 
believed were the right ones for Japan, not necessarily the United States.  In many cases, 
what was right for Japan overlapped with what was right for the United States.  This, 
after all, is a necessary ingredient for a successful alliance: an overlap of national 
interests.  This natural overlap of national interests may give the impression to the casual 
observer that Japan is simply doing whatever the United States asks for.  The reality in 
the post-9/11 era is that Japan is clearly moving away from the Yoshida Doctrine and 
becoming more assertive within the context of Article Nine. 
3. Changing Security Environment in the Post-Cold War Era 
Japan had the opportunity to renew and reaffirm the security alliance with the 
United States in 1960.  Although there was a significant controversy surrounding the 
renewal of the security treaty, the LDP wisely chose to continue with the alliance.  Unlike 
in 1951, Japan now had a real opportunity to choose whether to continue with the alliance 
or not.  The world had changed significantly in the nine years since the alliance first went 
into effect.  The Soviet Union was now just as powerful and influential in world affairs as 
the United States.  The world was no longer unipolar with the United States on top alone: 
it was now a bipolar world with two superpowers.  Essentially, the world was now 
separated by ideological differences, mainly communist against capitalist.  In this regard, 
Japan was clearly in the capitalist group and would benefit more by continuing its 
                                                 
21  Thomas U. Berger, Mike Mochizuki and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, Japan in International Politics : The 
Foreign Policies of an Adaptive State (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers : Published in association with 
the Japan Forum on International Relations, 2007), 2. 
22  Samuels, Securing Japan : Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, 96. 
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relationship with the United States.  Furthermore, nothing had changed with regard to   
the article which outlawed the use of force to settle international disputes so Japan still 
had to depend on the alliance for protection.  Although there was no clear strong side or 
weak side during this period, Japan clearly chose to balance with the United States 
against the perceived threat, the Soviet Union.  However, Japan was still bandwagoning 
with the United States, in the sense that it was in the alliance in order to free ride so that it 
could spend more money on economic growth at the expense of defense spending.23  
Japan became the second largest economy in the world due in large part to the Yoshida 
Doctrine, as well as to the general stability of East Asia due to the presence of the U.S. 
forces in the Pacific. 
In any case, the Soviet threat and the containment of communism ensured that the 
alliance between the United States and Japan remained very important on both sides of 
the Pacific.  In a sense, things were fairly simple in the Cold War era because of this.  
However, policymakers from both Japan and the United States would have to ask some 
hard questions regarding where to take the alliance in a world where the Soviet threat no 
longer existed. 
The late eighties and the early nineties were a turbulent time in world affairs.  The 
Berlin Wall came down, the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War came to an end.  
Francis Fukuyama infamously declared the “end of history”24 and President George H.W. 
Bush declared a new world order.  Many U.S.-Japan alliance policy makers and scholars 
began to question the need for an alliance in the post-Cold War era in which the main 
justification had been to balance against the menacing Soviet threat and the spread of 
communism.25  If continued, what shape would the alliance take now that the world was 
unipolar? 
 
                                                 
23  Samuels, Securing Japan : Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia, 57. 
24  Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York : Free Press ; Toronto; New 
York: Maxwell Macmillan Canada; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992), 418. 
25  Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Re-Emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 41. 
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 Clearly, there were many bumps along the road of the post-Cold War alliance.  
The first test came after Iraq invaded Kuwait and the world united to oust Saddam’s army 
out of the small, helpless country.  The international community expected Japan, as the 
second largest economy in the world, to make real contributions to the effort.  However, 
then-Prime Minister Kaifu flopped significantly, was unable to demonstrate decisive 
leadership, and was ridiculed by the world community when all Japan could do was 
contribute money and eventually sent minesweepers to the gulf after the hostilities had 
ended.26  To be fair to the prime minister, the 13 billion dollars that Japan provided was 
far more than what any other nation provided monetarily, although what the coalition 
wanted and expected were actual boots on the ground.  Japan learned the lesson that in 
the post-Cold War era of international politics, the “checkbook diplomacy” that had been 
a sufficient foreign policy option for Japan for decades since the end of the Second World 
War was no longer acceptable. 
 In any case, this embarrassing chapter in Japan’s history had a tremendous impact 
on the evolution of the U.S.-Japan alliance.  A combination of checkbook diplomacy and 
the lack of a single, credible threat weakened the foundation for the alliance.  The world 
was unipolar again with one strong hegemon.  The end result in Europe appeared 
obvious, but what would the situation look like in East Asia?  It did not take long for the 
answer to become apparent.  The security situation in Asia did not become more stable as 
a result of the Soviet collapse.  Communism was still alive in Asia, as two of the last 
three remaining communist regimes in the world were in Asia (China and Vietnam), 
albeit communist in name only as both countries acted more capitalist than communist.  
Nevertheless, China was beginning to flex its military muscle, intimidating Taiwan in 
1996 by conducting missile exercises during the Taiwanese presidential elections.27  
North Korea was also behaving belligerently with its nuclear programs and testing of 
ballistic missiles.28  Clearly, the post-Cold War situation in East Asia had the potential to 
become unstable and volatile rather quickly.  In short, a strong alliance between the 
                                                 
26  Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy : Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs, 56. 
27  Berger, Mochizuki and Tsuchiyama, Japan in International Politics : The Foreign Policies of an 
Adaptive State, 197. 
28 Ibid., 48. 
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United States and Japan was as important in the post-Cold War era as in any other time in 
its history.  Recognizing this fact, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto 
reaffirmed the alliance in 1996,29 and the Bush-Koizumi years of the alliance have been 
the strongest since Reagan-Nakasone. 
B. NORMALIZATION 
1. Defining Normalization 
 In the years since the first Gulf War of 1991, Japan has undergone many changes 
with regard to foreign policy.  Japan was heavily criticized and ridiculed by the 
international community for her “checkbook” diplomacy despite the fact that the 
financial contribution of Japan, at 13 billion U.S. dollars, was significantly higher than 
most countries’.  The lesson learned by the leaders of Japan was that willingness to place 
a nation’s troops in harm’s way carried more weight than providing money to help 
support a major combat operation.  Eventually, the Japanese sent minesweepers to the 
gulf, but these efforts were generally deemed too little, too late.  As stated earlier, 
President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto met in Tokyo in 1996 and reaffirmed 
the mutual defense treaty and ensured the relevance of the security relationship between 
Japan and the United States in a post-Cold War world where many questioned the 
validity of the relationship since the main threat to Japan, the Soviet Union, was no 
longer in existence.  This reaffirmation between Clinton and Hashimoto was a key factor 
in ensuring Japan’s foreign policy would be closely linked to American foreign policy for 
the foreseeable future.  Additionally, the 1998 North Korean Taepodong missile launch 
over Japan and the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the 
Pentagon ensured that Japan could no longer afford to play a passive role in international 




                                                 
29 Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift ( New York: Council on Foreign Relations; September 1999),  
94-120.  
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“normalization” of the SDF had become a critical issue in order for Japan to not suffer 
the same kind of humiliation it suffered from the international community in its response 
to first Gulf War. 
 Determined to not repeat the mistakes of his predecessors, Prime Minister 
Koizumi swiftly took action to ensure Japan’s active participation in the war on terrorism.  
Unlike some of his predecessors who failed to identify a crisis situation, Koizumi 
immediately recognized the 9/11 attacks as an urgent situation requiring his immediate 
attention.  He immediately set up a headquarters with himself in charge.  He kept the 
Japanese public informed through press conferences the following day denouncing 
terrorism and expressing his support for President Bush.  Japan also provided significant 
financial aid to the victims.30  However, Koizumi’s most important action was his ability 
to quickly push through the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML).31  This 
was an important achievement for Koizumi because of the speed at which the law was 
passed.  He passed a major piece of legislation authorizing the deployment of Japan’s 
SDF during a time of war in three weeks.  This was a remarkable achievement when one 
considers that it normally takes the Diet months to pass a bill dealing with security issues.  
He knew he had to act immediately to ensure his window of opportunity did not close 
from either a domestic perspective (public support) or an international perspective (to 
avoid another “checkbook” diplomacy fiasco).  Arguably, Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
actions to ensure Japan’s use of the SDF to contribute to Japan’s international 
responsibilities to the world (kokusai koken)32 have been the most effective of any prime 
minister since the end of the Second World War. 
Normalization of Japan implies that Japan is not normal.  Japan is “abnormal” 
because normal states “have control over their own constitutions and are defined by a 
monopoly over the use of violence, both internally and externally.”33  Andrew Oros 
                                                 
30  Shinoda, Koizumi Diplomacy : Japan's Kantei Approach to Foreign and Defense Affairs, 92. 
31  Ibid., 86-98. 
32  Berger, Mochizuki and Tsuchiyama, Japan in International Politics : The Foreign Policies of an 
Adaptive State, 5. 
33  Marilyn Ivy, "Trauma's Two Times: Japanese Wars and Postwars," Positions: East Asia Cultures 
Critique 16, no. 1 (2008), 171. 
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discussed the “fear among many that Japan is being ‘normalized’ into developing military 
capabilities and approaches in line with its great power status.”34  According to Richard 
Samuels, the critics of the normalization of Japan define “normal nation” as a “nation that 
can go to war.”35  Ichiro Ozawa argues that there are two requirements for a nation to 
become normal.  First, a nation must “willingly shoulder responsibilities that are regarded 
as natural in the international community and must not refuse such burdens on the 
account of domestic political difficulties.”36  By “domestic political difficulties,” Ozawa 
is clearly referencing Japan’s unwillingness to practice collective self defense and refusal 
to revise or reinterpret Article Nine.  Ozawa has been among the most vocal members of 
the Diet in expressing the importance of Japan’s becoming a “normal” nation so that it 
could contribute to the international community commensurate with economic status.  
The final condition that a nation must meet to be considered normal is to “cooperate fully 
with other nations in their efforts to build prosperous and stable lives for their people.”37  
For the purposes of this thesis, the definition of “normal” will be the ability to use the 
SDF to influence international affairs commensurate with economic power and the ability 
to practice collective self defense, as the two issues go hand in hand.  As the second 
largest economy in the world, one can argue that Japan has not influenced international 
security issues commensurate with its economic power, and the official position of Japan 
on collective self defense is that it is not permissible under the current constitution. 
2. Constraints to Normalization 
Although this thesis suggests that Japan’s security policy must continue evolving 
to ensure that Japan is able to practice credible leadership in world affairs, there are 
obstacles that must be overcome to continue on the path of normalization.  The obstacles 
can be broken down into roughly three separate categories: constitutional, domestic and 
foreign constraints. 
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a. Constitutional/Bureaucratic 
The first obvious constraint to normalization is constitutional.  After all, if 
one were to take Article Nine literally, one could argue that the existence of the SDF is 
unconstitutional.  This is the position of the Japan Communist Party (JCP), the political 
left and some on the right of the spectrum.  However, one does not necessarily have to 
have this extreme view to understand that Article Nine does indeed pose a problem for 
anyone who desires an expanded role for the SDF, something this thesis suggests is 
necessary for the continued normalization of Japan 
No discussion of constitutional/bureaucratic constraint is thorough without 
discussing the role of the CLB.  As discussed by Samuels, the CLB has had a tremendous 
role in shaping security policy through its narrow definition of “war potential” in 1952, 
its 1954 ruling that collective self defense is unconstitutional and its 1981 ruling that 
“recognized Japan’s right of collective self defense but declared its exercise forbidden.”38  
The CLB’s rulings were seen as beneficial to supporters of the Yoshida Doctrine, because 
any time the United States wanted Japan to participate in a crisis with more than just 
money, the Japanese government could always fall back on the excuse of 
unconstitutionality based on the ruling by the CLB.  In the post-Cold War era, as various 
Japanese leaders have attempted to increase Japan’s role in international affairs, the CLB 
has continued to rule against collective self defense, against the wishes of the leadership.  
Although a reinterpretation of Article Nine by the CLB would seem to be the simplest 
solution to the ban on collective self defense, this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable 
future, and Japan cannot afford to not participate in world affairs because of it.  As long 
as the CLB continues to rule that Japan is forbidden from practicing collective self 
defense, it will continued to be marginalized by the Normal Nationalists39 (a group 
described by Richard Samuels as pro-normal nation, including such members as Ozawa) 
who will be forced to pursue the issue of normalization through other means, such as 
continuing to pass legislation such as the ATSML and ISML. 
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b. Public Opinion (Domestic Pressure) 
The importance of public opinion when dealing with reform cannot be 
overstated, whether one is talking about campaign finance reform, postal reform, or 
constitutional reform.  Koizumi’s success with postal reform would simply have not been 
possible without the support of the public.  Likewise, Prime Minister Abe’s priorities of 
constitutional reform did not coincide with the public’s greater concerns over the 
economy.  As a result, the LDP lost control of the Upper House in the Diet, Abe’s health 
deteriorated from the stress and he stepped down to take responsibility. 
When dealing specifically with normalization, public opinion is especially 
crucial, as it can actually go against normalization rather than support it or be indifferent 
to it.  Constitutional reform provides an excellent example to illustrate the point that 
public opinion can go against further normalization.  Unlike Abe, Koizumi demonstrated 
that he was aware that the public did not support revising the constitution.  As a result, 
Koizumi based his plan to normalize the SDF within the context of the constitution and 
Article Nine.  He succeeded in normalizing without changing or reinterpreting the 
constitution.  Abe, on the other hand, swung too far to the right by making constitutional 
revision one of his priorities. 40  Had he succeeded, there is no doubt that it would have 
been one of the most significant victories for a prime minister in the postwar period.  
Unfortunately for Abe, not only was the public uninterested in constitutional reform as a 
means to further normalization, but many citizens also believed he was going too far to 
the right on this particular issue.  In short, he was opposed because he failed to read the 
pulse of the public, which had other priorities such as economic and social issues. 
c. Asian Gaiatsu (Foreign Pressure) 
Gaiatsu, which translates to external or foreign pressure, also plays a 
major role in Japanese foreign policy.  In Japan’s case, there are two types of gaiatsu, 
each pulling foreign policy in opposite directions.  On one hand, there is Asian gaiatsu 
from Japan’s neighbors such as China, Russia, and the two Koreas, who oppose an 
                                                 
40  J. A. A. Stockwin, "From Koizumi to Abe: Same Bed, Different Dreams?" Japanese Studies 27, no. 
3 (2007), 228. 
 23
expansion of the SDF’s role in international affairs.  On the other hand, there is American 
gaiatsu that encourages Japan to expand its role in international affairs by using the SDF 
to conduct more regional security duties and not only peace keeping operations (PKO).  
This is especially true in the context of the alliance, specifically on the issue of collective 
self defense.  The fact that the alliance is not equated with “an attack on one is an attack 
on all” does not sit well with many U.S.-Japan alliance policy makers on both sides of the 
Pacific.  Japan has been encouraged in recent years to do more by senior U.S. 
government officials such as former deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and 
former assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye.41  The two officials recommended, in 
what became known as the Armitage Report, that the U.S.-Japan alliance model itself 
after the “special relationship” between the United States and Great Britain.42  Clearly, 
the implication was to do more militarily and with security issues.  A 2007 version of the 
report also makes recommendations to further strengthen the alliance.43 
Clearly, the gaiatsu that constrains on further normalization of Japan’s 
security policy is the Asian form of gaiatsu.  Although the United States presumably 
would like to see a more assertive Japan that is willing to take more responsibility for 
security in the Asia Pacific region and relieve some of the burden from U.S. forces, it is 
unlikely that the other major powers in the region are willing to see Japan expand the 
SDF, because this would more than likely require the Japanese government to reinterpret 
the constitution to allow for collective self defense.  It goes without saying that nations 
such as China and both Koreas, which suffered the brunt of the Imperial Japanese Army’s 
atrocities both during and before the Pacific War, are not interested in seeing any 
expansion of Japan’s military, even in a peacekeeping role, much less an expanded 
military role required of a collective security environment.  When the leaders of the PRC 
need support at home for an important issue, the quickest way to unify the country and 
gain support is to use nationalism.  The easiest method to exploit nationalism is through 
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Japan-bashing techniques.44  Even Russia would rather not see an expanded role for 
Japan’s self defense forces for a number of reasons, including territorial disputes with 
Japan over the Northern Territories and, perhaps most important of all, a lack of a peace 
treaty with Japan formally ending the Pacific War.  All these factors contribute to the fact 
that although it has been over 60 years since the end of the Second World War, Japan’s 
neighbors are still sensitive about the revival of Japanese militarism, due to factors such 
as the perceived lack of sincere apologies from Japan, controversy over Japanese history 
textbooks’ whitewashing Japanese atrocities and perhaps most troublesome irritant has 
been Prime Minister Koizumi’s continued visits to the Yasukuni Shrine which enshrines 
14 class “A” war criminals, including Prime Minister Tojo.  All of these actions 
contribute to the lack of trust among the major powers of Asia with regard to Japan.  
Distrust of Japan will likely continue to constrain any efforts to further normalize Japan’s 
security policy. 
C. CONSTRAINTS ON PRIME MINISTER INVOLVEMENT 
 It is generally a safe assumption that most non-Japanese would have a difficult 
time identifying who Japan’s prime minister is.  As Kenji Hayao once said, the Japanese 
prime minister is the one leader who appears to be the odd man out, gazing out at the 
scenery alone in the group photo of the leaders of the G-8, while the other leaders huddle 
together into groups to discuss business.45  Perhaps the position of the Japanese prime 
minister simply does not gain the respect of his German chancellor or French president 
counterpart because the Japanese prime minister is viewed as a “weak” leader.  If so, why 
is he viewed as “weak,” and why was Koizumi different from other prime ministers, both 
before and after his time?  Before one can analyze this, it is important to briefly discuss 
the position of the Japanese prime minister. 
The system of government in Japan is a constitutional monarchy with a 
parliamentary system similar to Great Britain.  Japan has an emperor who is essentially a 
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figurehead with no real power.46  Unlike in Great Britain, where the Queen is the head of 
state, the Japanese emperor is merely a symbol.47  Only two men have been emperor 
since the end of the Pacific War; Hirohito, the wartime emperor who died in 1989, and 
his son and successor, Akihito.  Hirohito was required to denounce his divinity after 
Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War and was retained strictly for symbolic reasons and to 
help American occupation forces govern Japan immediately following the war.48  The 
head of government in modern Japan is the prime minster.  The prime minister is 
generally the president of the ruling political party and is elected into office by a majority 
of Diet members.  Every postwar prime minister since the formation of the LDP in 1955 
has been a member of the LDP, with the exception of three: Hosokawa, Hata, and 
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Table 1.   List of Postwar Prime Ministers.[From The Prime Minister of Japan and His 
Cabinet website. Modified by author]49 
 
Prime Minister Years Length in Years50 
Naruhiko Higashikuni 1945-1945 1 
Kijuro Shidehara 1945-1946 1 
Shigeru Yoshida 1946-1947 1 
Tetsu Katayama 1947-1948 1 
Hitoshi Ashida 1948-1948 1 
Shigeru Yoshida 1948-1954 6 
Ichiro Hatoyama 1954-1956 2 
Tanzan Ishibashi 1956-1957 1 
Nobusuke Kishi 1957-1960 3 
Hayato Ikeda 1960-1964 4 
Eisaku Sato 1964-1972 7.5 
Kakuei Tanaka 1972-1974 2 
Takeo Miki 1974-1976 2 
Takeo Fukuda 1976-1978 2 
Masayoshi Ohira 1978-1980 2 
Zenko Suzuki 1980-1982 2 
Yasuhiro Nakasone 1982-1987 5 
Noboru Takeshita 1987-1989 2 
Sosuke Uno 1989-1989 1 
Toshiki Kaifu 1989-1991 2 
Kiichi Miyazawa 1991-1993 2 
Morihiro Hosokawa 1993-1994 1 
Tsutomu Hata 1994-1994 2 
Tomiichi Murayama 1994-1996 2 
Ryutaro Hashimoto 1996-1998 2 
Keizo Obuchi 1998-2000 2 
Yoshiro Mori 2000-2001 1 
Jun’ichiro Koizumi 2001-2006 5.5 
Shinzo Abe 2006-2007 1 
Yasuo Fukuda 2007-2008 1 
Taro Aso 2008-present  
 
Due in large part to the way prime ministers were selected in the postwar years 
until Koizumi’s tenure, prime ministers were largely considered weak and lacking 
authority.  Large and powerful factions had a major influence on who became prime 
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minister.  The end result in a system where the factions had tremendous leverage was that 
the best person for the job was not necessarily the one who got the job.  To put Lord 
Bryce’s 1888 question51 “why great men are not chosen presidents?” in the context of 
Japanese politics, this is precisely the reason why great men were not chosen as prime 
ministers in Japan. 
However, this is not to say that some capable men did not perform well and 
demonstrate strong leadership in foreign policy.  In addition to Yoshida, men such as 
Kakuei Tanaka presided over the normalization of relations with China after the Nixon 
Shock of 1971,52 and the longest serving postwar premier, Eisaku Sato, was the driving 
force who negotiated Okinawa’s return to Japanese sovereignty after being in American 
hands since the end of the Pacific War.53  Although strong leadership was rare in the 
postwar years, it did exist in a select group of prime ministers even before the 
institutional changes that strengthened the kantei in the nineties. 
 Max Weber defines authority as “the legitimate exercise of power.”54  The three 
categories of political leadership that he describes are traditional, rational-legal, and 
charismatic.  Traditional authority refers to power achieved through custom and tradition, 
such as a king’s ruling over his kingdom.  Power is usually passed on through patrimonial 
means on to other family members.  Some examples would include France and Russia 
before their respective revolutions.  The key point is that allegiance is owed to the person, 
not necessarily the position.  Rational-legal authority refers to power achieved through 
rules and regulations characteristic of modern democracies in which the leader is elected 
by the people and is backed by a government bureaucracy of some sort.  In this case, 
allegiance is owed to the office held and not necessarily the person occupying it.  
Leadership in this system will not necessarily pass to relatives automatically as is 
generally the case in the traditional authority.  And finally, Weber describes charismatic 
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leadership as the “power legitimated by the ability of an individual to inspire devotion 
and obedience on the basis of extraordinary characteristics.”55 
 In Japan’s case, although emperors have ruled for many centuries, the shogun ran 
the country in the emperor’s name until the Meiji Restoration.  Following the restoration, 
a prime minister continued the tradition of governing in the emperor’s name.  This 
tradition was changed after the Pacific War, with the emperor denouncing his divinity.  
As a result, the postwar years have clearly been rational-legal rule where the emperor was 
merely a symbol of the state and held no power and the government was operated under 
the leadership of a democratically-elected Diet.  It is also clear to scholars of the alliance 
that Japan has not produced many charismatic leaders in the postwar era.  When one 
thinks of the charismatic leaders as Weber defines it, names such as Mao, Hitler, 
Mussolini, Gandhi, and Mandela probably come to mind.  Washington, Lincoln, and 
Roosevelt among the great American presidents, also come to mind.  Not many postwar 
Japanese prime ministers are easily identified as charismatic; perhaps Yoshida and 
Nakasone at the national level and outspoken Tokyo governor Ishihara at the local level.  
This thesis argues that Koizumi’s name belongs on the very short list of postwar leaders 
who used charismatic leadership to successfully make his vision a reality. 
 One must keep in mind that it is tempting to assume that Koizumi’s success as a 
leader has been due to the strengthening of the kantei as a result of electoral and cabinet 
reforms and that anyone could be as effective under the new system.  One need not look 
further than Abe and Fukuda to realize this is a losing argument.  Despite electoral and 
cabinet reforms, factions, bureaucrats, and opposition parties remain strong and can lead 
to the downfall of an administration if the leader does not use the various tools available 
to his advantage.  The main advantage created by the electoral and cabinet reforms for a 
prime minister have to do with his ability to gain grassroots support and popularity to 
take power away from the factions and to give that power to the people.  Koizumi proved 
that popularity was his greatest political capital and asset and used this capital to his 
advantage.  When post-Koizumi leaders rely on the old school factions and the traditional 
way of doing business in leading their administrations, they tend to be as ineffective as 
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the pre-reform prime ministers.  Until future leaders understand how to lead using the 
Koizumi playbook, they will likely continue to perform ineffectively. 
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III. ARGUMENTS 
A. IN FAVOR OF KOIZUMI LEADERSHIP 
As was stated in the previous chapter, this thesis argues that all else equal, 
Koizumi’s personal leadership and sharp political skills had the most significant impact 
on the expansion of Japan’s post-9/11 security policy.  The first half of this chapter will 
present the argument in favor of Koizumi’s role and provide the evidence to support this 
claim.  The second half will focus on the alternative arguments. 
 Although a few postwar leaders can be characterized as charismatic, this thesis 
argues that Koizumi can be included in the very short list of postwar Japanese leaders 
who relied on charismatic leadership, as well as rational-legal leadership skills, to 
successfully lead reforms that resulted in the expansion of Japan’s security policy and, 
ultimately, greater prestige in international affairs. 
 There is little doubt that Japan has been on the path of normalizing almost 
immediately since the end of the Cold War in 1991.  Some may even argue that Japan has 
been on the path of normalization since the day the SDF came into existence almost 
immediately following Japan’s regaining sovereignty after the occupation.  However, 
there is no doubt that the SDF’s role has expanded significantly in the years following the 
first Gulf War.  In any case, how much it has normalized and how much further it can 
normalize is certainly open to debate.  The first overseas deployments of the SDF 
occurred in the aftermath of the first Gulf War when Japan sent minesweepers to the gulf.  
Not long after this deployment, ground SDF troops began PKO in Cambodia.56  
However, what set Koizumi apart from other prime ministers such as Kaifu was his 
ability to recognize a crisis situation and respond accordingly in a decisive manner. 
 Prime Minister Koizumi ensured that Japan was an active participant in 
international affairs following the September 11, 2001 attacks and did not repeat the same 
mistakes of Kaifu during the first Gulf War.  The first step in the process was the Diet’s 
approving the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) in October of 2001.  This 
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law made possible the SDF’s participation in noncombat roles such as peacekeeping on 
the ground and support of combatants of other nations logistically by providing supplies 
and fuel.  Predictably, the left argued that the law was unconstitutional because it sent the 
SDF overseas and its actions would violate the ban on collective self defense by 
providing fuel and ammunition to the combatant forces.  The right argued that this law 
demonstrated the inability of the ruling coalition to push through constitutional reform.  
In any case, the message that Koizumi sent to the United States and to the world was that 
the Japan of 2001 would not resort to the checkbook diplomacy of the 1991 version of 
Japan and would put boots on the ground to support the war on terrorism.  Koizumi did 
not stop here.  He pushed through emergency legislation bills to the Diet in April 2002,57 
and in 2003, the Diet passed the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and 
Reconstruction Assistance which authorized the dispatch of SDF soldiers to Iraq.58 
Koizumi’s critics will argue that any prime minister could have passed these bills after 
the terrorist attacks.  This thesis argues that this argument is valid only if the terrorist 
attacks occurred in Tokyo.  Koizumi had the sense to understand that this was an 
international crisis that required action from the Japanese government.  Many of 
Koizumi’s predecessors demonstrated an inability to characterize an international 
incident as a crisis situation that required action from Tokyo.  This inability to recognize 
a crisis inevitably led to a slow and weak response from Tokyo.  Having the ability to 
recognize a crisis is only half of the equation.  The other half is taking action on it.  
Koizumi articulated the crisis to the Japanese public and pushed through the necessary 
legislation rapidly to ensure that Japan participated with the SDF and not just with 
money.  This is an important distinction that sets Koizumi apart from other Japanese 
leaders. 
 All else equal, Koizumi’s leadership drove the foreign policy expansion of Japan 
in the post-9/11 security environment.  Although situational reasons may provide a 
conducive environment, institutional reasons may provide some helpful tools, and a 
strong bureaucracy working with the leader and not against him are all important, this 
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thesis argues that all of the factors mentioned are meaningless without a strong leader 
willing and able to use the tools available to him.  He must also have the ability to gauge 
the pulse of the public and have the sense of timing necessary to make his move at the 
most opportune time to maximize his chances for success.  Many writers, both American 
and Japanese, have published a great deal of literature about Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
various reforms during his time in office.  Although the majority of the material may not 
explicitly state so, the fundamental argument is that leadership matters and Koizumi was 
able to accomplish many of his reforms because he was Koizumi.  The general theme 
underlying the pro-Koizumi school of thought is that Koizumi was a masterful politician 
who expertly orchestrated some major reforms that were heavily resisted not only by the 
opposition parties but by the members of his own party as well.  Clearly, Koizumi was a 
maverick who vowed to change the LDP and was willing to destroy the party in order to 
accomplish his goals.  He was willing to put his job on the line.  In short, he had political 
courage.  Through his own popularity and charismatic leadership, he went directly to the 
people to obtain a mandate to push through the reforms. 
Kabashima and Steel emphasize the influence of Koizumi as an individual in 
changing Japan both internally and externally.59  They believe that although Koizumi has 
been compared to other leaders such as Britain’s Tony Blair,60 “Koizumi ended his 
tenure with an electoral majority that would be the stuff of dreams for Blair.”61  The 
implication here is that as a “revolution,” his tenure had more impact than a “restoration” 
such as the Meiji Restoration when Japan experienced a rapid change from an isolated, 
backward country to a modern nation that could compete with other industrial and 
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imperial powers.62  In other words, Koizumi’s reforms were nothing short of the 
unprecedented changes that occurred during the Meiji Period.  Although the use of the 
term “revolution” to describe the reforms that Koizumi championed is clearly an 
exaggeration, Koizumi did make a difference by expanding Japan’s security policy 
further than any other postwar prime minister and as a result, became the most influential 
Japanese prime minister since Shigeru Yoshida. 
Additionally, Kabashima and Steel studied the role that television played in 
Koizumi’s victory in the 2001 LDP presidential election.63  They analyzed the effect that 
the media and various television programs played in exploiting Koizumi’s personal 
popularity like no other politician in Japan before him.  Just as television played a major 
role in electing John F. Kennedy to the U.S. presidency in 1960, it played a significant 
role in Koizumi’s election in 2001.  However, the authors acknowledge that there was 
more to this than just a great media personality.  Television appearances, combined with 
the political reforms of 1994, and a desire for change by a public tired of economic 
stagnation, were instrumental in providing a positive image of a highly energetic leader 
who promised to push through various reforms.  Although there is no doubt that these 
factors and institutional reforms helped him gain power, Koizumi’s use of the media was 
a major contributor to his ability to gain grassroots level support - not only to gain power, 
but also to wield it once elected as LDP president.  Koizumi revolutionized the way a 
Japanese leader uses the media to gain support.  In other words, Koizumi’s political as 
well as media savvy were responsible for his success. 
One of Koizumi’s greatest strengths as a political leader was his ability to gauge 
the pulse of the public and to use public opinion to his advantage in pushing through 
various reforms.  Another factor to consider was the prime minister’s ability to use time 
to his advantage if public opinion was not as solid as he would have preferred.  For 
example, when it was still not clear whether the Japanese public would support the plan 
to send the SDF overseas to participate in GWOT, Koizumi simply made the 
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commitment to President Bush that Japan would support the United States and reported 
this to the public after the fact.  This was a clear demonstration of his strong leadership. 
Koizumi’s task in the aftermath of 9/11 was to find a balance between not 
violating Article Nine and simultaneously taking action with the SDF to demonstrate to 
the United States and other allies that Japan had learned its lesson from the first Gulf War 
and intended to participate in GWOT militarily.  He demonstrated exceptional political 
skill and courage in the successful expansion of Japan’s security policy during this 
challenging period in international affairs. 
1. Koizumi’s Popularity 
The importance of popularity on a leader’s ability to get the job done is something 
that is not unique to Japan.  This is an important factor for any leader of a democratic 
nation to consider if he or she wants to get re-elected or ensure his or her party remains in 
power.  If popularity were not important, there would be no need to take public opinion 
polls or for political analysts and strategists to study approval ratings of a leader.  One 
can argue that the Republican nominee for the 2008 presidential elections lost the 
election by a rate of two to one in the electoral college due largely in part to the low 
approval ratings and general unpopularity of the incumbent Republican president.  
Clearly, popularity does matter in a democracy.  
Patterson and Maeda studied the impact of how the personal popularity of a prime 
minister impacts an election.  Their study indicated that popularity does indeed have a 
“modest but definite impact” on how well the LDP has done in the postwar period.64  In 
this work, the authors examined data on postwar elections and determined that having a 
popular leader does help the LDP do well in lower house elections.  They concluded that 
an effective prime minister from an electoral perspective is someone who is a “strong, 
proactive leader who does far more than search for a consensus.”65  The key word here is 
“consensus.”  For many years, especially during Japan’s bubble years, a strong stereotype 
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existed in the United States that the Japanese cared mainly about consensus building.  In 
order for a decision to be made, all parties involved had to agree to a consensus.  In 
Western societies, the ability to confront others and to have the “courage” to follow one’s 
own convictions, even if they aren’t popular was viewed as a character trait that exhibited 
strength.  “Mavericks” who were willing to take on their own party were viewed as 
strong and those who tried to reach a consensus were viewed as weak, or worse yet, 
appeasers. 
When one studies the leadership traits of the postwar prime ministers, it is safe to 
say that the consensus builders did not do well in terms of both popularity and 
effectiveness.  And being a maverick will not necessarily make one more popular or 
effective.  It truly takes a special breed to challenge the bureaucracy and the party and 
remain popular and effective.  In Koizumi’s case, was he popular because he was a 
maverick or was he effective because he was popular?  Clearly, he was not popular 
because he was a maverick.  If this explanation were true, Abe should have been able to 
ride on Koizumi’s coattails and push through some of the reforms he was interested in 
pursuing.  Clearly, Abe lacked Koizumi’s charisma, sense of timing, and, perhaps most 
important, the ability to gauge the pulse of the public.  As for the second part of the 
question, there is no doubt that Koizumi was able to effectively govern as a result of the 
mandate that he received from the public.  In short, he used his popularity as political 
capital to use against the Diet members who opposed him. 
However, as we will discuss in the case study on the first Gulf War, popularity or 
general support for a particular administration’s cabinet does not necessarily mean that 
the incumbent prime minister will get his way when it comes to pushing through political 
reforms or going against the wishes of the opposition parties.  Prime Minister Kaifu was 
unable to achieve the political reforms that he staked his career on, despite a 57.9 percent 
support level for his cabinet, when he announced his reform proposal to the Diet only 
several months following Japan’s checkbook diplomacy fiasco.66 
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In Koizumi’s case, he capitalized on his popularity through his relationship with 
the media.  This relationship was a win-win situation for both Koizumi and the media.  In 
exchange for more access to the prime minister than at any other time in Japanese history 
from the mass media’s point of view, Koizumi was able to exploit this to his advantage 
by showing up on “wide” shows, news programs, and sports shimbun (newspapers) to 
gain support from the public.67  He looked different from the typical politician with his 
wavy, “lion” hair.  He spoke differently from the typical politician.  He often spoke 
colloquially in a manner more easily understood by the general public.  He used the 
internet to get his message out to the public.  In short, Koizumi valued the importance of 
the media like no other politician before or since and used the mass media to exploit his 
great strength and the source of his political capital, his popularity. 
2. The Impact of Domestic and International Crisis 
How a leader responds to a domestic or international crisis will make or break his 
legacy.  One need not look further than Prime Ministers Kaifu or Mori68 to understand 
how a lackadaisical attitude in dealing with a crisis can lead to the downfall of an 
administration.  Likewise, one need not look further than Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
decisive actions immediately following the 9/11 attacks to see how strong leadership will 
be rewarded with a long and prosperous reign that will likely end on the incumbent’s own 
terms. 
The impact of a crisis on political leadership is something that is not unique to 
Japan.  The great American presidents mentioned earlier in this chapter were “great” 
precisely because they were able to demonstrate such strong leadership in times of crisis.  
In other words, it is difficult to judge a leader’s effectiveness until one has had a chance 
to see him perform under pressure.  Without the Civil War, Lincoln may have been 
average and not great.  Without the Gulf War fiasco, Kaifu may have been average and 
not below average.  Likewise, without 9/11 and GWOT, Koizumi may have been unable 
to expand Japan’s security policy to the level he was able to expand it to.  There is no 
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doubt that situational factors played a significant role in Koizumi’s success.  However, 
there is also no doubt that without Koizumi’s initiative and leadership, the window of 
opportunity would have rapidly disappeared.  The following section will study Koizumi’s 
specific actions to expand Japan’s security policy. 
3. Immediate Actions in Response to 9/11 
 Prime Minister Kaifu failed to recognize Gulf War One as a major crisis that 
required strong leadership at the highest levels of the Japanese government.  Rather, he 
saw it as an issue for bureaucrats in MOFA to deal with.  Likewise, Prime Minister Mori 
failed to see the Ehime-Maru incident as a crisis that required his immediate attention.  
He reportedly continued with a golf game69 upon hearing the news that a U.S. nuclear 
submarine had surfaced underneath a research vessel carrying young Japanese students, 
killing nine passengers.70 
Prime Minister Koizumi, on the other hand, immediately recognized the 9/11 
attacks as an international crisis and responded accordingly.  Within 45 minutes, the 
Situation Center of the Cabinet was activated to gather information and within 2 hours of 
the attacks, he upgraded the Situation Center to an Emergency Anti-Terrorism 
Headquarters with the prime minister personally in charge.71  Unlike his predecessors, 
Koizumi identified the situation as a crisis and determined that this was a situation that 
could not be delegated to subordinates.  Koizumi also took action to ensure Japan 
provided monetary assistance, including $10 million to the families of the victims as well 
as $10 million for cleanup and recovery efforts in New York and Washington72.  Had 
Japan not learned its lesson from checkbook diplomacy, it might have stopped with 
monetary contributions.  On September 12, 2001, Koizumi publicly expressed his 
condolences to the victims of 9/11, and, more importantly, he pledged his full support to 
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the United States for any cooperation deemed necessary to combat terrorism73.  In this 
statement, Koizumi outlined specific actions that the National Security Council of Japan, 
with the attendance of all cabinet ministers, agreed to do.  Specifically, Japan agreed to 
provide security for U.S. facilities in Japan such as military bases, housing areas, 
consulates and the embassy; take necessary action to prevent “confusion in the economic 
systems” throughout the world; and, perhaps the most significant policy item of all: 
“Japan will respond in cooperation with the United States and other concerned nations to 
combat international terrorism.”  Many policymakers questioned the meaning of this 
statement.  What could Japan possibly do with Article Nine still in place?  Koizumi did 
not take long to answer that question. 
 Koizumi immediately took action and demonstrated that in order for Japan to gain 
any credibility from the international community, especially the United States, he had to 
send a message to the world by rapidly orchestrating a SDF deployment overseas under 
wartime conditions, something that had been taboo in both Japanese politics and society 
since Japan’s defeat in 1945.  Koizumi’s mission was to break this taboo and to do it as 
quickly as possible.  Koizumi’s actions indicated that time was of the essence; that the 
longer he took to act, the more difficult it would be to pass any legislation to make it 
possible; that this would make it nearly impossible for Japan to regain credibility lost in 
the first Gulf War. 
 In order for Koizumi to fulfill his promise to President Bush, he needed to ensure 
the ATSML was pushed through the Diet as quickly as possible.  This law would legally 
allow the dispatch of the SDF overseas in wartime conditions for the first time since the 
end of the Second World War.  The ATSML clearly outlined the actions permissible and 
not permissible as the SDF carried out its first “real” operations overseas in over a half a 
century.  Some of the specific actions allowed under the law included providing logistics, 
maintenance and repair services, transportation services, communications, and medical 
services.74  Specifically, the law forbids the SDF to provide fuel and ammunition to 
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aircraft taking off on offensive sorties.75  The free fuel provided to the coalition by the 
MSDF in the Indian Ocean would become a major controversial issue in the coming 
years as the Diet in the post-Koizumi years failed to pass an extension before the 
expiration of the law, which caused some tension in the U.S.-Japan alliance.  
Additionally, the government’s inability to account for the fuel provided to the coalition, 
which was necessary to ensure that the SDF did not violate the ATSML with regard to 
providing fuel to ships and aircraft en route to offensive sorties, became a major issue 
that contributed to the lapse in the refueling mission. 
In any case, one can safely assume that based on the lessons of history from the 
first Gulf War, Koizumi understood the importance of sending the SDF overseas to 
support Bush’s coalition and this would not be possible without passing the ATSML.  
The ATSML would allow Koizumi to normalize the SDF mission further than any other 
prime minister both before and after his tenure.  The significance of Koizumi’s success in 
passing the ATSML lies not only in the fact that it was passed but also in how rapidly he 
convinced the Diet to pass it.  There is little doubt that Koizumi’s popularity and high 
approval ratings gave him the mandate to push through this legislation rapidly.  
According to the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 70 percent of the respondents supported Japan’s 
support of the United States in the GWOT.76  Furthermore, Koizumi’s cabinet approval 
ratings were at 79 percent.77  These numbers suggest that Koizumi was able to sell the 
importance of the mission to stand with the United States in the war against terrorism.  
Some would suggest that any prime minister would have been able to pass the ATSML 
with the numbers that Koizumi enjoyed.  This thesis argues that the Koizumi enjoyed the 
high approval ratings and public support for GWOT because his administration made it a 
priority and sold it to the public as a necessary action to fulfill Japan’s responsibilities to 
the international community.  This was not something that any prime minister could do.  
Most of his predecessors and all of his successors, with the exception of the incumbent 
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prime minister,78 have repeatedly demonstrated that by and large, they prefer to pass bills 
through the Diet in the traditional method through the normal bureaucratic channels, 
attempting to reach consensus.  In short, the process would have taken too long to have a 
positive impact on Japan’s international image.  It took someone like Koizumi who could 
identify what a crisis was and was willing to take risks to do what was right for Japan.  
Clearly, the Diet had little choice but to support the extremely popular prime minster, 
and, as a result, the bill was enacted into law on October 29, 2001, after less than 3 weeks 
of debate.79  The significance of how rapidly this law was enacted cannot be overstated.  
In a country where laws rarely get passed in less than a month, especially on matters 
related to security or constitutional issues,80 this was a remarkable achievement driven by 
the strong leadership of Prime Minister Koizumi. 
4. Expanding Role of the SDF and JCG 
 Japan deployed minesweepers to the Persian Gulf after the checkbook diplomacy 
incident to attempt to regain some credibility from the international community and to 
fulfill what Japan saw as its obligation to the international community.  Although largely 
seen as “too little, too late,” this deployment was still considered a major step forward for 
the normalization of Japan’s security policy, after years of passive behavior exemplified 
by the Yoshida Doctrine.  The deployment was rationalized as a maritime safety 
deployment, rather than a deployment to support combat operations, albeit post-
hostilities.  This distinction was important to gain the support of the public as well as to 
prevent any major political backlash from Japan’s former enemies and colonial 
possessions.  The last thing Japan needed as it attempted to contribute to the international 
community was an adverse public reaction domestically and conflicting gaiatsu from the 
rest of the world.  In any case, the MSDF’s successful deployment to the Persian Gulf  
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paved the path for future SDF operations overseas such as the UN PKO deployment to 
Cambodia.  The success of this UN operation further solidified the SDF’s growing 
positive image, both domestically and abroad. 
 Another factor to consider in Japan’s expanding role in international security is 
how Japan has used its Coast Guard in recent years.  The Japan Coast Guard (JCG) or the 
kaijo hoancho is officially under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, 
similar to the way the United States Coast Guard (USCG) was under the Department of 
Transportation prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security.  Another 
similarity is the way the USCG falls under the Department of Defense during wartime 
and how the JCG also falls under the MOD in an emergency.81  To borrow David 
Leheny’s term, the Japanese government has been using the JCG as a “canary in the coal 
mine” rather effectively.82  Because the JCG is a police agency rather than a military 
force, it has much looser rules of engagement when it comes to firing at vessels that 
illegally enter Japanese territorial waters.  Prime Minister Koizumi revised the Coast 
Guard Law in October 2001 to “allow the outright use of force to prevent maritime 
intrusion and to protect the Japanese homeland.”83  Additionally, Koizumi increased the 
budget of the JCG, leading to more roles and responsibilities, since he could not increase 
the defense budget.  Just as it is easier to allow more leeway for the JCG to conduct its 
mission of “securing the safety of the sea lanes” and “maintaining order on the seas,”84 it 
is easier to provide more money to the JCG rather than the MSDF.  The factor that allows 
this is the distinction between “military” and “police” force.  This is necessary to 
minimize Asian gaiatsu.  Senior officials at the MOD are quick to point out that the JCG 
is not a fourth branch of the military.  And although the relationship between the JCG and 
the MSDF has been getting closer in recent years, it is important to make sure the two 
organizations keep some distance.  The perception that they are part of the same 
organization will undermine the JCG’s ability to do what they can do because they are a 
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police force and not a military one.  The expanding role of the JCG shows that Koizumi 
and the LDP were thinking out of the box and expanding “militarily” in a way that does 
not alarm Japan’s neighbors.  As John Bolton once said, the buildup of the JCG was “a 
way for Japan to avoid going through tortured constitutional constraints and to build its 
capabilities.”85 
 Koizumi’s critics may argue that the expansion of the JCG may have happened on 
Koizumi’s watch but he did not necessarily drive it.  This statement is simply untrue.  
Things did not “just happen” on his watch.  Koizumi deliberately made increasing the 
JCG budget a priority.  This was evidenced by his appointment of Komeito lawmaker, 
Kazuo Kitagawa, as the minister for Land, Infrastructure and Transport.  Initially, 
Komeito, as well as the JCP, would not support increasing the MOD’s budget.  By 
appointing Kitagawa as the minister overseeing the JCG, Koizumi was able to get the 
Komeito to support increasing the JCG’s budget.86 
 Koizumi did not stop with his emphasis on the JCG by just increasing its budget.  
In April 2005, he also used the JCG as an instrument to balance against China’s rising 
power by joining forces with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in announcing a 
new global partnership emphasizing “enhanced security cooperation on a sustained basis 
between the two nations’ navies and coast guards.”87  And furthermore, Koizumi became 
the first prime minister of Japan to ever attend a JCG Academy graduation in March 
2006.  All of these actions provide solid evidence that Koizumi placed great importance 
in the role of the JCG as an instrument to further normalize Japan’s security policy while 
simultaneously respecting the various constraints that prevent him from expanding SDF 
too rapidly. 
 Notwithstanding the expanding role of the JCG, it is still considered a police force 
and not a military force.  In order for Koizumi to continue normalizing Japan’s security 
policy, he had to expand the role of the SDF.  What did Koizumi specifically do to 
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expand the SDF’s role to further Japan’s international contributions during the post-9/11 
era?  The following paragraphs will attempt to answer this question with regard to 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 
a. Deployment in Support of OEF 
 In order for Koizumi to dispatch SDF troops to support the coalition 
against the war on terror, the first step he had to take was to get the Diet to pass the 
ATSML.  Without this law, he could not legally deploy the SDF.  As was stated earlier in 
this thesis, Koizumi was able to turn this bill into a law in less than a month.  This 
achievement is unprecedented in Japanese history.  Why did this bill become a law so 
rapidly? 
 Midford argues that Japan’s sensitivities to the conflicting gaiatsu 
(concerns over a rise of Japanese militarism from Asia and pressure to do more from the 
United States) and a strong record of responsible deployment of the SDF on UN missions 
are among the more important reasons why Japan was able to deploy the SDF in support 
of OEF.88  He also acknowledges Koizumi’s high approval ratings by the public as a 
major factor.  He observes that his predecessor, Mori, with approval ratings as low as 15 
percent, would have had a difficult time accomplishing what Koizumi did.89  Having high 
approval ratings and favorable signals from Asian neighbors are meaningless unless the 
leader has the ability to recognize the situation as the time to take decisive action.  
Koizumi was clearly the driving factor in getting the ATSML passed and deserves the 
credit for the contributions that Japan made to OEF. 
 Unlike in the first Gulf War where Japan’s monetary contributions and 
post-hostilities minesweeping operations were largely unacknowledged, Japan’s refueling 
operations in OEF have been praised by almost all participants in the war on terror.90  In 
the era of rising fuel costs, the MSDF tankers are essentially free, floating gas stations in 
the middle of the ocean.  JMSDF’s presence in the Indian Ocean provided the Japanese 
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an opportunity to “show the flag” and a tangible piece of evidence that Japan is in on the 
fight against terrorism.  This was the result of Koizumi leadership. 
b. Deployment in Support of OIF 
 Once again, Prime Minister Koizumi demonstrated strong, decisive 
leadership rarely found in a Japanese prime minister.  Unlike in 2001, where he had a 
significant amount of public support, many citizens opposed a deployment to Iraq in 
2003.  Polls taken by the Asahi Shimbun from December 2002 to June 2003 indicated that 
anywhere from 60 to 80 percent of those who responded were against the U.S. military 
invasion of Iraq.91 
 The 2003 Iraq Special Measures Legislation was a crucial piece of 
legislation that the Diet had to pass in order for Koizumi to expand the SDF’s role as he 
planned to.  Without this law, he could not legally deploy the SDF to Iraq.  Although 
many Japanese citizens did not necessarily agree with Koizumi on the need to send the 
SDF to Iraq, as evidenced by several polls taken throughout 2003,92 the LDP-Komeito 
coalition still won the majority of the seats in the lower house Diet election of November 
2003.  Ishibashi provides several reasons93 why the LDP was successful despite public 
support for a deployment to Iraq but despite these reasons, the victory gave Koizumi the 
mandate necessary to do what he believed was the right thing to do.  This demonstrates 
that Koizumi is not a “yes” man who is afraid of going against the constituents if and 
when he believes that Japan’s best interests are at stake.  His specific contributions to this 
process were to have the vision necessary to understand that Japan had to place actual 
“boots on the ground” in Iraq.  Despite unfavorable polling data from the public, he 
pushed this legislation through rapidly in the Diet.  He was able to do so by emphasizing 
that the SDF would be providing a “reconstruction” mission rather than a combat 
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mission.  Ultimately, the GSDF troops served on the ground in Iraq from January 2004 to 
July 2006 and the mission was a success by all standards.  Any time the SDF successfully 
completes a “real” deployment overseas, it improves the SDF’s reputation abroad, 
especially with Japan’s former enemies.  This results in less gaiatsu and less resistance to 
Japan’s continued normalization.  Koizumi should receive a great deal of credit for this 
successful mission. 
5. Relations with Asian Neighbors 
 Japan’s relations with its Asian neighbors play a significant role with regard to 
Japan’s ability to expand its security policy.  The amount of gaiatsu that Japan receives 
from China and the Koreas has had an inverse relationship to the expansion of Japan’s 
security policy.  The less gaiatsu from neighbors resulted in greater expansion of security 
policy.  As discussed in the section on constraints, Asian gaiatsu is generally directly 
related to how well a leader interacts with neighboring heads of state. 
 Japan has had a difficult relationship with China for decades.  Following the end 
of the Pacific War and until the normalization of relations between China and the United 
States following the “Nixon Shocks,”94 Japan had very little contact with China.  In the 
years that followed, the relationship can be generalized as one of economic 
interdependence but competition in terms of regional leadership, political influence, and 
military tension as the PLA grows with a perceived lack of transparency from Tokyo and 
Washington’s perspective.  From China’s perspective, the perceived lack of a sincere 
apology from Japan concerning wartime aggression, history textbook controversy, and 
territorial disputes with regard to the Diaoyutai/Senkakus95 remain a sticking point in any 
attempt to completely normalize relations. 
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 Another important episode in recent China-Japan relations relevant to Japan’s 
normalization was China’s missile tests during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996.96  
Although the missile tests were clearly used to intimidate Taiwan, Japan’s vulnerability 
to Chinese missiles was also exposed as a result of the test.  Some have argued that 
Japan’s use of the North Korean missiles as its primary threat and excuse for a more 
robust military posture and cooperation with the United States on BMD is actually in 
response to Japan’s real threat, China. 97 Regardless of whether this statement is true, the 
cliché of “perception is reality” appears to be the driving factor in China’s predictable 
resistance to the project.  China’s reaction to BMD in East Asia is comparable to the 
Russian resistance to BMD in Europe, although in both cases, the reported threat is not 
China or Russia.  In any case, there is no doubt that China’s provocative behavior toward 
Taiwan, as well as recent bumps in Sino-Japanese relations, such as a Chinese submarine 
penetrating Japanese territorial waters, has had a positive impact on the Normal 
Nationalists’ cause. 
 Japan has had a difficult relationship with the Korean peninsula long before the 
twentieth century.  Meiji oligarch Aritomo Yamagata famously declared that the Korean 
peninsula was a “dagger pointed at the heart of Japan.”98  Japan fought wars with China 
(1894-1895) and Russia (1904-1905) for influence over the peninsula.99  With South 
Korea, historical issues and territorial disputes with Dokdo/Takeshima100 also contribute 
to tension between the two nations; however, Japan and South Korea are de facto allies 
by virtue of their respective alliances with the United States.101  From this perspective, it  
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is even more crucial that Japan maintain a close, working relationship with South Korea 
to help maintain stability on the Korean peninsula, which is in the best interest of all 
nations involved. 
 Japan’s relationship with North Korea is full of complications.  Despite Japan’s 
financial contributions to Kim Jong Il’s regime, Tokyo receives little cooperation from 
North Korea on resolving the abduction issue.  The North’s nuclear ambitions102 have 
long caused the Japanese a great deal of concern and were the catalyst for Japan to 
engage in missile defense with the United States.  The JCG’s first ever real world 
engagement and sinking of a “spy” ship turned out to be of North Korean origin. 
 With regard to the abduction issue, Koizumi is often not given the credit that he 
deserves in getting Kim Jong Il to confess to something that the Japanese had suspected 
for decades.  In 1992, during normalization103 talks, the North Korean delegation walked 
out on the Japanese when this issue was brought up.104  The fact that Koizumi was able 
to obtain this confession from Kim is remarkable.  Abduction of citizens by a foreign 
state entity can be interpreted as an act of war and result in war from one end of the 
spectrum to international criticism on the other end.  Imagine what the United States 
government would have done if it had become public knowledge that Soviet KGB agents 
were abducting American citizens off of the beach in Florida and taking them back to the 
Soviet Union to use as English language instructors and American culture teachers for 
Soviet agents.  This is essentially what North Korea was doing to Japan.  Koizumi was 
the one who made this stunning confession possible by convincing Kim that it was in his 
best interests to own up to this. 
 Under Koizumi’s leadership, Sino-Japanese relations with China and both Koreas, 
became extremely lukewarm.  Many argue that this was due in large part to Koizumi’s 
hawkish views and insistence on visiting Yasukuni Shrine105 despite protests from China 
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and the Koreas.  The shrine, located in Tokyo, has been the source of a great deal of 
controversy with regard to Japan’s relations with Asian neighbors who suffered the brunt 
of Japan’s military aggression in the first half of the twentieth century, because it 
enshrines the spirits of Japan’s war dead, including 14 Class “A” war criminals106 who 
were included in 1978.107  War-time Prime Minister Hideki Tojo is among those 
enshrined in Yasukuni.  There are two conflicting viewpoints with regard to official visits 
to Yasukuni by a sitting Japanese prime minister.  On the one hand, one could argue that 
protesting against a prime ministerial visit to Yasukuni is like protesting an American 
presidential visit to Arlington National Cemetery.  On the other hand, if a German 
chancellor visited the grave site of Adolph Hitler, it would more than likely spark an 
international outrage.  The problem with Yasukuni is that it represents a situation 
somewhere in between the two extremes.  Yasukuni enshrines all of Japan’s war dead, 
most of whom were honorable soldiers that gave their lives for their country and emperor 
and were following the orders of their superiors.  However, the war criminals, as defined 
by the Tokyo war crimes tribunal, are also enshrined there.  Unfortunately, the war 
criminals receive the bulk of the publicity when it comes to official visits to the shrine by 
senior government officials.  In other words, the prime minister cannot pay his respects to 
the millions of other war dead without giving the appearance that he is glorifying Japan’s 
militaristic past.  Although there is little doubt that these visits did cause tension in 
Japan’s relationships with Asian neighbors, there is little evidence that Koizumi visited 
Yasukuni to antagonize the other nations.  It is safe to assume that, as a strong leader, 
Koizumi was unwilling to allow other national leaders to dictate whether he should or 
should not be allowed to pay his respects to Japan’s war dead.  Just as Chinese leaders 
view issues such as Taiwan or Tibet as internal matters that are not subject to debate from 
foreigners,108 Koizumi likely believes that his decision to visit the shrine is his own 
personal choice that is not subject to debate from foreigners.  In any case, the fact that 
Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni caused a great deal of tension between Japan and 
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China/Koreas indicate that the actions of one man can indeed make a difference in 
foreign policy, in both positive ways as well as negative. 
 How did Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni affect normalization?  Did it hurt 
normalization or did it proceed despite Koizumi’s visits?  The evidence in this thesis 
suggests that normalization continued despite these visits.  Koizumi’s critics, both 
domestic and foreign, have criticized him for his reckless behavior and blatant disregard 
for the ramifications of these visits.  His critics may also argue that since normalization 
continued despite Koizumi’s causing strain in Asian relations, he was not as important as 
his supporters claim.  The simple answer to the question of why normalization continued 
despite Koizumi’s “reckless” behavior is that he was a strong enough leader to simply 
ignore Asian gaiatsu as an obstacle to normalization.  In short, Asian gaiatsu is an 
obstacle to normalization only if a leader allows it to constrain him.  Similar to Gerald 
Curtis’ argument that Koizumi did not necessarily change the existing political structure 
and that he simply ignored it,109 this thesis argues that Koizumi simply ignored the 
gaiatsu.  One man’s perception of “reckless” behavior can be viewed by another man as 
political courage to take action based on principle rather than cave in to external pressure. 
6. Koizumi’s Relationship with President Bush and Its Impact on 
Foreign Policy 
 The relationship between Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush was clearly 
the closest between the leaders of the two nations since the “Ron-Yasu” relationship110 
between then-Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and then-President Ronald Reagan.  
During Koizumi and Bush’s first meeting in Camp David in June 2001, the two leaders 
took the opportunity to get to know each other on a personal basis and agreed to work 
together on strengthening the alliance to promote peace and stability throughout the 
region, economic partnership for growth, and cooperation on global challenges such as  
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global warming.111  This first meeting between the two leaders would provide a solid 
foundation for a close relationship and cooperation not only between two men but 
between two nations for the next five years. 
 During Koizumi’s final tour of the United States prior to stepping down as prime 
minister, President Bush hosted a dinner in honor of Koizumi in the State Dining Room 
at the White House.  During his speech, the president told the prime minister that “our 
strong friendship has grown out of the strong alliance between our two nations.”112  This 
thesis suggests that a stronger alliance has grown out of the strong friendship between 
Bush and Koizumi.  The following day, President Bush took the prime minister on a tour 
of Graceland.  Koizumi is well known for his love of Elvis Presley.  He famously 
serenaded the president with an excellent imitation of the King of Rock and Roll.  Bush 
even compared Koizumi to a famous Japanese baseball star, Ichiro Suzuki of the Seattle 
Mariners, saying that like Ichiro, Koizumi can hit anything that is thrown at him.113  This 
close relationship is clearly something that cannot be easily duplicated by just any group 
of leaders due to the genuine friendship between Koizumi and Bush.  Although many 
scholars believe that Japan had no choice but to support the United States if it hoped to 
receive reciprocal support on the North Korean abduction and nuclear issues or that 
Koizumi was a leader that would have provided the same kind of support to any U.S. 
president as this thesis suggests, the role of this strong bond between the two men is 
something that must not be dismissed when analyzing the strong nature of the alliance 
during the Bush-Koizumi years. 
 What impact did the Bush-Koizumi friendship have on the normalization of 
Japan’s security policy?  Critics claim the relationship was too close114 and argue that if 
it were not for the close friendship between the two leaders, Japan would have never sent 
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the SDF to Iraq.  The essence of the argument is that “Japan is like the 51st state in the 
union”115 and that Koizumi would simply do whatever Bush tells him to do.  This is an 
unfair statement and an inaccurate characterization of the Bush-Koizumi relationship.  
Furthermore, the two statements, made by opposition party member Fukushima are 
conflicting in nature.  Did Koizumi send the SDF to Iraq because of his close friendship 
with Bush or did he send the SDF to Iraq because he was in a subordinate relationship 
with Bush as the “51st state” argument suggests?  Clearly, the latter argument is simply 
left wing propaganda.  The former argument is a bit too simplistic.  There is no doubt that 
the close friendship and personal chemistry between the two leaders provided an 
environment of close cooperation and directly resulted in a “closer strategic, ideational, 
and economic convergence of the United States and Japan”116 and this situation made it 
much more likely that a strong leader like Koizumi would step in and ensure he 
supported his close friend while simultaneously ensuring the country that he led 
contributed more to international affairs as the world’s second largest economy can and 
should be expected to.  In short, the close relationship of two men who happened to be 
leaders of two nations with overlapping national interests gave the appearance that one 
was simply doing as the other wished.  In reality, both were doing what was best for his 
respective nation.   
Despite the fact that Koizumi was doing what was in Japan’s best interests, there 
is little doubt that his close friendship with George Bush made it easier for Koizumi to 
sell his plan to the Japanese public that this was an investment into gaining Bush’s 
personal support for future assistance from the United States in dealing with East Asian 
issues such as the North Korean problem.  And clearly, the Japanese public was 
concerned about East Asian instability caused by Kim Jong Il’s regime.  In short, 
although both men were doing what was best for their respective nations, Koizumi’s 
close friendship with Bush enabled him to sell his plan to the Japanese public much 
easier than if they had not had a close relationship.  In this sense, their friendship was  
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another factor that made expanding Japan’s security policy a less stressful experience for 
Koizumi compared to another prime minister who may not have enjoyed this close 
relationship to the American president. 
B. ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS 
Many of Koizumi’s critics argue that Japan has been on the path of normalization 
no matter who occupies the office of prime minister.  In other words, the leadership of the 
prime minister does not matter and other factors such as institutional rules, a powerful 
bureaucracy or situational reasons drive normalization. 
1. Institutional 
 The institutional school of thought argues that Koizumi was simply the fortunate 
leader who happened to occupy the office of prime minister after many reforms had 
already transferred the office from a relatively weak position into something much more 
powerful and presidential or Westminster-like.  Prior to the implementation of the 
Cabinet Reform Law of 1999, the office was indeed much weaker than it is today.  
Consensus building was the norm within the cabinet and the non-elected bureaucracy 
made government policy with the politicians simply rubber-stamping anything the 
“experts” submitted.  Prime ministers were often at the mercy of the powerful factions 
that helped them get into office in the first place.  This sentiment was clearly reflected by 
senior government officials such as Ichiro Ozawa who once said that the prime minister 
was “nothing more than a master of ceremonies for the ritual at hand.”117 
 Prior to 1999, several prime ministers expressed a desire to make the kantei 
stronger.  Prime Minister Nakasone was among those who believed that the office should 
be more “presidential.”118  Prime Minister Hashimoto was also concerned about the 
weakness of the kantei and one of his goals was to strengthen it and the cabinet.119  What 
were some of the reasons for these concerns?  Clearly, there were several major crisis 
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situations in which the central government was ineffective in taking action because of 
weak leadership which resulted in a slow response.  Among the more high profile of 
these events include the first Gulf War, the Tokyo subway gas attacks and the Kobe 
earthquake.  The prime minister was severely limited in his ability to take action in a 
timely fashion because of the difficulty in reaching a consensus or gaining support from 
the various factions in order to move. 
Tomohito Shinoda is among the leading scholars on Koizumi’s “top-down 
leadership.”  Through several case studies, one on the antiterrorism legislation120 and 
another on the deployment of ground troops to Iraq,121 he argues that Koizumi was the 
beneficiary of institutional changes that some of his predecessors implemented when the 
government was seen as weak by the Japanese public.  Specifically, Prime Minister 
Hashimoto was driving force in some changes to strengthen the cabinet secretariat in the 
aftermath of the Kobe earthquake and the Tokyo subway gas attacks.  The Japanese 
government’s inadequate response to these situations was a great concern from the 
public’s perspective.  Although Shinoda acknowledges the role of Koizumi’s personal 
leadership, he addresses in detail the changes that took place to strengthen the kantei to 
transform it into a more of a counterpart to the White House.  These are the changes that 
Shinoda argues that Koizumi benefited from to effectively practice his top-down 
leadership.  Once again, there is no doubt that Koizumi was assisted by a system more 
favorable and suited to his style of leadership.  However, it is clear that institutional 
changes alone do not guarantee success for the leader of the new and improved kantei.  
After all, if institutional reasons alone drove Japan’s post-9/11 normalization, how does 
one explain Prime Ministers Abe and Fukuda’s relative ineffectiveness under the same 
system that Koizumi succeeded in?  This question will be analyzed in greater detail in the 
case studies section. 
 Chris Hughes, like Shinoda, argues that in addition to Koizumi’s immense 
popularity with the public, he utilized the tools available to him through the 
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improvements in the kantei to successfully deploy troops overseas in support of OEF in 
Afghanistan as well as OIF.122  He specifically gives credit to the Cabinet Law of 1999 
which “clarified the prime minister’s authority to propose key policies at cabinet 
meetings, with the effect of strengthening the prime minister’s top-down executive 
leadership while diluting the traditional bottom-up style of Japanese decision-making.”123  
Although Hughes gives Koizumi some credit, like Shinoda, he clearly places more 
weight on institutional changes rather than personal leadership with regard to 
normalization. 
 Additionally, the Central Government Reform (CGR) in January of 2001 also 
increased the power of the prime minister and his cabinet by introducing a system of 
senior vice-ministers and parliamentary secretaries and clarification of the prime 
minister’s legal authority for proposals to the cabinet, among other measures.124  Perhaps  
most significant of all in Koizumi’s case was the CGR’s measure to create the Council on 
Economic Fiscal Policy (CEFP), as Koizumi demonstrated his willingness to make 
economic policies and decisions from the top-down and not from the bottom-up. 
It is important to note that although the bulk of the literature covered in this 
section on institutional argument focuses on improvements to the kantei as a result of 
electoral and cabinet reforms, the constraints associated with Article Nine are also very 
much an institutional issue that provides a counterbalancing effect to the strengthening of 
the kantei.  In other words, although the kantei has indeed become a more powerful 
entity, it has not been sufficient to override the self-imposed constraint that the article 
provides. 
This thesis does not dispute the relevance of the institutional changes that have 
strengthened the kantei.  The prime minister has, without question, gained more powers 
as a result.  This thesis argues that these changes and improvements are meaningless 
without the right kind of leader in charge who knows how to take advantage of these 
improvements.  Koizumi’s style of leadership demonstrates a successful method of using 
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the new and improved kantei to effectively govern.  Post-Koizumi leaders have yet to 
demonstrate the ability to effectively govern under this new system because they appear 
to lack the same leadership skills that Koizumi possesses. 
2. Bureaucratic 
The bureaucratic school of thought argues that the bureaucracy in general trumps 
the power of any single leader in Japanese politics, including the prime minister.  In other 
words, the bureaucrats draft and implement policy from the bottom-up and the elected 
politicians simply nod their heads and rubber stamp anything that the subject matter 
experts forward to their desks.  This school of thought was especially dominant during 
Japan’s bubble years when the conventional wisdom was that the bureaucrats at the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) were driving Japan’s economic 
policies.  The developmental state school of thought was made famous by Chalmers 
Johnson.  In the context of normalization of Japan’s security policy, the key bureaucratic 
players represent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Defense 
(MOD), formerly known as the Japan Defense Agency (JDA).  These bureaucrats have 
participated significantly in U.S.-Japan security alliance issues throughout the Cold War 
and post-Cold War years in issues such as base realignment, host nation support, etc.  
Although these bureaucratic functions and tasks are indeed very important “nuts and 
bolts” issues with regard to the maintenance of the alliance, this thesis argues that when it 
comes to expanding Japan’s security policy as defined by the author, it takes strong 
leadership by the prime minister to do so.  For example, the bureaucracy is not capable of 
deploying the SDF overseas during wartime conditions.  It takes the leadership of a 
strong prime minister who has the political capital and the communications skills 
required to convince the Japanese public that it is the right thing to do. 
 Although most literature available on the power of Japanese bureaucracies tends 
to focus naturally on economic issues, the information is nevertheless important to review 
in order to gain a solid understanding of how powerful and influential non-elected but 
highly educated career bureaucrats are in policy making from the bottom-up.  Is there a 
power struggle between bureaucrats and the elected politicians with regard to policy 
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making?  If so, is the struggle a zero sum game where the power of the prime minister is 
diminished at the expense of a strong bureaucracy or can a strong prime minister co-exist 
with a powerful bureaucracy?  Johnson is among the best known advocates of the school 
of thought that focuses on the effectiveness of large bureaucracies such as the MITI and 
MOFA.  Johnson argues that the bureaucrats of MITI were largely responsible for 
Japan’s rapid economic growth in the postwar period.125  The main problem with the 
developmental state school of thought is that it focuses its attention mainly on how things 
appear to be on automatic pilot when things are going well but does not address how 
things would be without strong leadership during times of crisis. 
 In order to understand the power of the bureaucracy, one must understand its 
origins and how it was originally staffed.  To accomplish this, it is necessary to look at 
Japan during the Meiji Restoration.  The Meiji Restoration was a period of major changes 
in Japan essentially resulting from the forced opening of Japan by Perry in 1853.126  The 
Shogun, who ruled Japan on behalf of the emperor (this arrangement was deliberately 
made by the House of Tokugawa in the seventeenth century to maintain legitimacy for 
the government),127 began to lose his grip on power when the people saw that the 
samurai were unable to defend Japan against the powerful and modern warships that 
Perry brought with him.  The black ships represented superior technology and industry 
that Japan did not possess.  The leaders of Japan were aware of China’s demise at the 
hands of Western colonialism128 and knew the only way to prevent being cut up and 
colonized by the foreign powers was to modernize and industrialize to become a colonial 
power themselves.  This eventually resulted in the end of the Tokugawa era and the 
samurai class and the beginning of Japan’s modernization.129  The goal for Japan in the 
Meiji era was to become a “rich nation” with a “strong army.”130 
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 The Japanese samurai of the Tokugawa era was not only a warrior but also a 
scholar and an artist.131  Many outsiders mistakenly assume that samurai were warriors 
only and had no other productive skills but this was simply not true.  Most were very well 
educated.  Once the Meiji Restoration occurred and the samurai’s military services were 
no longer required, a large number of samurai traded their sword for a pen and became 
Japan’s first modern bureaucrats.132  This process of bureaucratizing the samurai class 
had actually begun earlier in the seventeenth century during the relatively peaceful era of 
the Tokugawa Period133 but the Meiji Restoration made it official by disarming them of 
their swords.  The point of this brief history is that the roots of Japan’s bureaucracy lie in 
the samurai class and the bushido ethos.134  They are used to being well respected and 
having the power to make a difference in Japanese society. 
 An important factor in the economic success of Japan was the architects of 
Japan’s successful industrial policy, the elite bureaucrats that led the MITI.  Unlike in 
other countries where public service does not necessarily attract the best and brightest 
college graduates, a position in MITI is considered to be an elite position, worthy of only 
the top graduates of the best universities in Japan.  Meritocracy was the rule when it came 
to recruiting for bureaucratic positions and the very best students from Japan’s top 
universities such as the University of Tokyo were offered the lucrative job of civil 
servants in ministries such as MOFA, MITI or MOF.135  As a result, there were many 
smart bureaucrats making decisions on how to run the economy.  The Amakudari 
system136 (translates to “descent from heaven”) also provided a crucial link between the 
government and the private sector, similar to the U.S. military industrial complex with its 
many former military officers become defense contractors and provide a means to a close 
working relationship between business and government.  With the Amakudari system, 
senior government officials move into management positions within private Japanese 
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companies and continued to have major roles in the economic policy of the country.  This 
is obviously not an all inclusive list, but the point is that a strong bureaucracy, with 
highly educated civil servants with close ties to the government, contributed significantly 
to Japan’s unprecedented economic growth. 
 Pempel and Muramatsu describe the role of bureaucrats in “The Japanese 
Bureaucracy and Economic Development: Structuring a Proactive Civil Service.”137  
Like Johnson, they stress the importance of the civil service and the role it played in 
Japan’s economic growth.  In particular, factors such as the bureaucracy’s ability to 
create an environment conducive for economic growth, the competitive factors built into 
the system for recruitment as well as inter-agency and intra-agency competition, and its 
ability to use its power and influence in growth-producing ways were instrumental in this 
regard. 
 Similarly, John Campbell discusses bureaucrats as elites and describes the 
recruitment and organization of the typical bureaucracy in Japan.138  Like Pempel and 
Muramatsu, Campbell stresses the high education and meritocratic recruitment of the 
civil service.  In Japan, very high achieving students want to enter civil service because it 
is viewed as an elite profession.  This work demonstrates how as a result of their elite 
education and high level of professionalism, Japanese bureaucrats enjoy a level of trust 
from the people that is difficult to find or duplicate elsewhere.  This trust and 
professionalism is arguably a major reason for the strength of the bureaucracy. 
 Some of Japan’s stronger prime ministers have significant ties to the bureaucracy.   
Leaders such as Ikeda, Sato and Nakasone have something in common besides serving 
four years or longer as prime minister.  They also happen to have been former elite 
bureaucrats before becoming politicians.139  This background certainly gave these leaders 
a leg up on prime ministers without a bureaucratic background because they had a solid 
understanding of policy making.  One can also safely assume that the personal 
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connections between the leader and the bureaucracy in these particular cases provided a 
mutually beneficial situation for governing purposes. 
Ko Mishima argues that although Koizumi was successful in strengthening the 
prime minister’s role in policy making, he was relatively ineffective in “undercutting 
traditional bureaucratic strength.”140  Nevertheless, Koizumi centralized policymaking 
through his assertive leadership, specifically through control of various committees and 
offices under the kantei such as the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP).  
Despite Koizumi’s assertive leadership, his efforts to restrain bureaucracies such as the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) were ineffective and Mishima provides some case studies on 
the privatization of the postal service, the privatization of the highway public corporation, 
and civil service reform to support his argument. 
On several occasions, high ranking bureaucrats have shown the willingness to go 
head to head against elected government officials.  Former Foreign Minister Makiko 
Tanaka famously was at odds with her top bureaucrats on a number of issues.141  
Recently disgraced Administrative Vice Minister of the Defense Ministry, Takemasa 
Moriya, also bumped heads with the Minister over issues such as the appointment of his 
successor, before his corruption charges became public.  This demonstrates that the 
bureaucracy is willing to fight elected officials to retain and maximize their power as 
bureaucrats. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the role of the CLB in interpreting the 
constitution, and, therefore, its ability to make foreign policy by ruling on what is 
permissible and not permissible under Article Nine, provides a strong argument in favor 
of bureaucratic entities trumping the wishes of the democratically elected politicians. 
Critics of executive leadership may suggest that bureaucratic power in general 
trumps the power of the prime minister, not necessarily in only security issues but in 
other areas such as economic policy as well.  Both the MOFA and the MOD have 
demonstrated in recent years that bureaucrats in these two ministries have had a great 
deal of influence over security policy in general with the Six Party Talks and especially 
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in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance with major issues such as the Defense Policy 
Review Initiative (DPRI) and the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) among 
others.  Nonaka argues that overall policy coordination even at the highest levels of 
government “is largely conducted through bureaucratic functioning.”142  Although this 
work on the normalization of Japan’s security policy by bureaucrats is a significant step 
in the right direction, for the steps that really count, it still takes prime ministerial 
intervention. 
All of this suggests that the bureaucracy is indeed powerful and, for the most part, 
well-respected with the Japanese public.  They are highly educated and highly competent 
in their respective career fields.  Koizumi demonstrated during his tenure that a powerful 
prime minister can co-exist with a powerful bureaucracy and that it was not necessarily a 
zero-sum game where one side needs to suffer at the expense of the other.  Koizumi 
succeeded in his domestic and international priorities without major conflicts with the 
bureaucracy.  He proved that he was driving Japan’s domestic and foreign policy, not the 
bureaucrats. 
3. Situational 
 The situational school of thought argues that situational factors beyond a prime 
minister’s control such as domestic public opinion, foreign pressure, or catastrophic 
events such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters, drive the nation’s foreign policy more 
so than the prime minister’s leadership.  Some refer to this as a “window of opportunity” 
while others may refer to it as “traumatic” events. 
Paul Midford analyzed why Japan was able to deploy its troops smoothly in 
OEF/OIF as compared to the fiasco of the first Gulf War.143  Midford concludes that 
Japan was able to do so because of a more favorable international environment.  
Specifically, he gives credit to the perception of Japan’s Asian neighbors of the SDF’s 
“responsible” PKO deployments since the early 1990s and refers to this as a “benign 
Asian reaction” to the deployment of the SDF.  This particular argument is certainly a 
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strong one.  As was discussed in the previous chapter, the Asian gaiatsu is a significant 
constraint on Japanese foreign policy and has been for many decades since the end of the 
Pacific War.  Japan’s responsible deployments of the SDF to areas such as Cambodia to 
provide assistance has improved the image of Japan’s military in the eyes of many former 
enemies or colonial possessions.  The successful deployment of Japanese troops to Iraq as 
well as the great contributions of the MSDF in the Indian Ocean will further contribute to 
the spread of the SDF’s positive image throughout Asia.  However, there is little reason 
to believe that Koizumi would not have reacted to the terrorist attacks differently or less 
aggressively had there been stronger Asian gaiatsu.  Koizumi has both articulated and 
demonstrated that he will not allow pressure from foreign governments to dictate how he 
governs Japan.  His visits to Yasukuni Shrine despite the protests from China and the 
Koreas provide solid evidence of this. 
 Natsuyo Ishibashi also concludes that Koizumi was able to deploy the SDF to Iraq 
was due largely to the Japanese public’s conflicting concerns over the domestic economy 
and the threat from North Korea, with the external threat outweighing the domestic issue. 
144  As a result, the public’s desire to maintain positive relations with the United States in 
the context of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty more or less forced the public to accept 
Japan’s obligations to the United States and the United Nations in the GWOT.  This 
argument fails to credit Koizumi in two specific ways in which Koizumi acted to ensure 
Japan’s contributions to the international community.  First, Koizumi understood before 
the majority of the citizens that Japan had to do this to maintain credibility in the eyes of 
the international community.  Second, Koizumi articulated this importance to the public 
in a manner in which the citizens understood that, despite their opposition to the Iraqi 
invasion, fulfilling their obligations to the international community was important if they 
wanted support in other areas such as the North Korean problem.  The public did not 
think of this on its own.  Koizumi had to cash in some of his popularity to get the public 
on his side. 
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Courtney Purrington argued that despite the world view that Japan’s behavior 
during the first Gulf crisis was reactive in nature, indecisive in general, lacking in 
assertive action, and more harmful than good for the relationship with the United States, 
Japan’s actions were “in historical perspective, swiftly implemented and unprecedented 
in terms of the prominent role Japan played.”145  He considered this crisis to be a major 
watershed in Japanese history, equivalent to the opening up of Japan to the world by 
Commodore Perry and the end of the Pacific War; both American-directed events that 
resulted in a change of behavior on Japan’s part.  This view gives the Kaifu government 
the benefit of the doubt by giving it credit for doing what it could do under the 
circumstances and historical context.  In other words, situational factors drove Kaifu’s 
actions. 
Peter Wooley argues that Japan’s reaction to the Gulf crisis can be explained from 
an organizational process model perspective.  Many critics of Japan were looking at the 
lack of response from a rational actor model perspective and Japan’s actions seemed 
irrational.  From the Japanese government’s perspective, it was reacting organizationally 
to the problem as it has done for decades in the postwar era and subsequent rise as an 
economic power.  The major difference was there was no crisis of this scale occurring 
simultaneously with Japan’s economy as large as it was in 1991 and with Japan 
extremely dependent on the oil from the region in question. 146 
In summary, it is foolish to completely disregard the argument that gives some 
credit to situational factors as contributors driving Japan’s foreign policy and this thesis 
will not attempt to do so.  However, it is equally foolish to suggest that situational factors 
alone drive a leader’s reactions.  A leader does not become great because of situational 
reasons.  Strong leadership already exists in an individual long before a crisis situation 
occurs.  The difference between a superior leader and an inferior leader is how he 
performs when a window of opportunity presents itself.  The great leaders will rise to the 
occasion and use the crisis as a window of opportunity to make things happen, whether it 
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is postal reform or constitutional reform.  The weak leaders will allow the window of 
opportunity to close and not only lose the chance to demonstrate greatness but will likely 
result in a short and ineffective tenure. 
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IV. CASE STUDIES 
A. PRIME MINISTER KAIFU’S PERFORMANCE DURING THE FIRST 
GULF WAR 
1. Checkbook Diplomacy and International Criticism 
This particular case study will provide the lesson that leadership does matter in 
times of international crisis.  Specifically, the ability to identify a situation as a crisis, the 
ability to make a command decision rapidly, and the ability to move the government to 
take those actions once the decision is made.  This section will demonstrate that Kaifu 
could have, but did not, make the choices that would have enabled Japan to make an 
international contribution commensurate with its economic status.  This section will also 
support the argument that strong leadership would have made the difference between 
checkbook diplomacy and effective diplomacy. 
Japan’s performance during the first Gulf War, or the lack thereof, is largely 
viewed as a major watershed in terms of a significant shift in Japanese foreign policy.  
Some have argued that this embarrassing chapter in Japan’s history is equivalent to the 
third opening of Japan; the first two being Perry’s arrival and MacArthur’s occupation.  
In any case, there is no doubt that all post-Gulf War One Japanese prime ministers were 
very aware that if a similar crisis ever occurred, it was imperative that Japan did not 
repeat those mistakes.  However, a few post-Gulf War One prime ministers have also 
demonstrated an inability to recognize major events or accidents as situations qualifying 
as a crisis.  Therefore, the ability to see a problem as a crisis is perhaps more important 
than the ability to take appropriate action when a crisis occurs. 
The first half of this chapter is devoted to analyzing what exactly happened that 
prevented Japan from acting swiftly and decisively when it needed to do so most.  




infighting that contributed to the slow response from the Japanese government, this thesis 
argues that the majority of the blame for the ineffectiveness of the Japanese response falls 
squarely on the shoulders of Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu. 
Kaifu became the prime minister of Japan on 8 August, 1989.  He replaced 
outgoing Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita, who resigned from office to take 
responsibility for the Recruit Cosmos scandal, which was essentially a stocks-for-favors 
scandal between Recruit Group executives providing stocks of the Recruit Cosmos 
Company to various politicians in exchange for political favors.147  The stock was issued 
to the politicians prior to floating it on the stock market, resulting in substantial profits for 
those cut in on the deal.  Many prominent politicians including the sitting prime minister, 
Takeshita, as well as former and future prime ministers, such as Nakasone and 
Miyazawa, were reportedly involved.148 
Kaifu, with a reputation as “Mr. Clean,” came into office with tremendous 
opportunity to clean up government by pushing through reforms that would help reduce 
the amount of corruption in government.  Then-LDP general-secretary, the hawkish 
Ichiro Ozawa, suggested to Kaifu the best way to clean up the government was by 
pushing through electoral reform; specifically, changing the 1955 system into a fully, 
Single Member District (SMD) system.  The idea was to reduce the influence of the 
various powerful factions within the LDP.  This reform also had the potential to turn the 
1955 system into a two party system, where all the smaller parties could be disappear as a 
result of the proportional representation seats being abolished.  Predictably, this reform 
was vehemently opposed by the opposition parties. 
Kaifu did not have a strong political base because he was a member of a small 
faction, the Miki faction.  He chose Ozawa as the party secretary general in deference to 
the largest faction in the LDP, the Takeshita faction, to which Kaifu owed his 
premiership.  Ozawa was an outspoken and controversial figure for his views on Article 
Nine and the importance of Japan revising or reinterpreting the ban on collective self 
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defense so that Japan could make international contributions commensurate with its 
economic status.  In any case, Ozawa believed that Japan’s “inconsequential role in 
international politics” was due to weak leadership, and weak leadership was a result of 
the Japanese electoral system.149 
This is the context under which Kaifu got dragged into launching an electoral 
reform process that simply did not have any traction within the government to begin with.  
It is necessary to understand this process and why the reform attempt failed in order to 
understand how he mishandled the first Gulf War.  One other factor to keep in mind is 
that these two events were happening simultaneously and Kaifu was forced to prioritize 
the two tasks.  He eventually chose the Gulf crisis as the task requiring the higher priority 
but as we will see in the following paragraphs, his half-hearted attempts to appease 
patrons, whether the United States government or the powerful LDP factions, ultimately 
resulted in failure in both domestic and foreign politics. 
2. The Deployment of Minesweepers to the Gulf 
As the government continued to debate on how to contribute to peace keeping 
operations, some LDP leaders began to advocate sending MSDF minesweepers to the 
Gulf.  The idea of sending minesweepers to the Gulf was not new.  Several months before 
the American-led Operation Desert Storm on August 15, 1990, then-American 
ambassador to Japan, Michael Armacost, on behalf of the United States government, 
formally requested a variety of services such as medical personnel, logistics, as well as 
minesweepers.150  Predictably, the Japanese government’s response was that under 
Article Nine of the Constitution, it would be impossible to oblige a request to send MSDF 
ships to the region to conduct a very real and very dangerous mission of sweeping mines. 
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The discussion on the possible deployment of minesweepers to the Gulf regained 
traction in early March 1991, after the hostilities had officially ended in late February.  
This was due in large part to the embarrassment suffered by Japan for its checkbook 
diplomacy.  Many political leaders, such as Ozawa and business and industry leaders, 
were determined to make sure that Japan participated with real people and equipment in 
any postwar peace building and reconstruction efforts.  Initially, the government 
attempted to navigate around the constitutional issues by creating a non-military entity 
comprised of retired SDF officers who would logistically support the efforts of those 
nations enforcing the cease fire.  However, there were many disagreements within the 
government over this policy.  Some, such as Ozawa, supported it, but MOFA preferred to 
send actual SDF officers instead so that the government could retain direct control over 
the operation.151  It was clear by mid-March that this debate would take too long and 
Japan would end up looking foolish again by demonstrating to the world that it could not 
make a decision.  As a result, many LDP members and MOFA began to urge the Kaifu 
government to dispatch the minesweepers to the Gulf.  The major newspapers were split 
on their opinion on this issue with Yomiuri and Sankei encouraging the government to 
deploy the MSDF.152 
The dovish Kaifu was perhaps too cautious and this trait added to Japan’s 
inability to respond quickly and decisively.  He wanted to conduct a study prior to 
committing the MSDF to the Gulf, saying that it would be “irresponsible without 
researching the current situation in the Persian Gulf.”153  This slow and cautious behavior 
reinforces Gaunder’s argument that Kaifu was unwilling to take risks in domestic policy.  
Here, he demonstrated that he was also unwilling to take risks in his foreign policy 
decisions. 
Eventually, under intense pressure not only from the hawkish LDP leaders and 
MOFA but also business leaders and organizations such as the Japanese Shipbuilders’ 
Association and the Seamen’s Union, Kaifu finally gave in and made the decision to send 
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the minesweepers to the Gulf.154  By the time Kaifu made this decision, it was early April 
2001, eight months after Armacost had first requested them from Japan.  Although some 
argue that this deployment was too little, too late, by and large, the efforts of the MSDF 
were greatly appreciated by the international community and one cannot help but to ask if 
the prime minister had not provided strong leadership sooner, perhaps the term 
“checkbook diplomacy” may have never been coined. 
3. Link Between Domestic Performance and Foreign Affairs? 
Gaunder provides an extensive study on some of the reasons why Kaifu failed to 
achieve the domestic reforms he set out to achieve.155  Specifically, she studies Kaifu’s 
failed attempt for electoral reform in the aftermath of the Recruit Scandal.  Gaunder 
concludes that Kaifu failed in his attempt to reform for three main reasons; 1) his 
unwillingness to take risks, 2) his lack of commitment to reform, and 3) his lack of 
vision.156 
Clearly, there is a link between a prime minister’s performance in domestic issues 
and his ability to conduct foreign policy.  In addition to Gaunder’s argument referencing 
the three main reasons that contributed to the failure of Kaifu’s domestic reforms; this 
thesis suggests that Kaifu’s inability to recognize the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq as a 
major international crisis that required his immediate attention also demonstrates a 
weakness of not only leadership, but perhaps more importantly, a lack of judgment.  Like 
Mori, who reportedly finished a round of golf upon hearing the news about the 
Greenville-Ehime Maru collision,157 Kaifu received word about the invasion of Kuwait 
while on vacation in Nagano but did not return to Tokyo until the following evening.158  
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It is difficult to solve a problem if one cannot define what the problem is.  Leaders who 
do not perform successfully in both domestic politics and foreign policy have repeatedly 
demonstrated a deficiency in this area and Kaifu is certainly no exception. 
The role of the domestic media in Kaifu’s inability to make a decision is also 
worth looking at.  Japan’s five major newspapers were split on their opinion on the 
feasibility of sending minesweepers to the Gulf.  Sankei and Yomiuri supported the 
deployment of minesweepers to the Gulf, Nihon Keizai, Asahi and Mainichi were against 
it.159  In a country where a large percentage of citizens read the newspaper and three out 
of the five newspapers listed above are among the top five newspapers in circulation in 
the world,160 the influence of the media on a Japanese politician’s decision making 
process is significant.  This is especially true for the leader who is unwilling to take risks 
that may result in him losing his job.  The difference between Koizumi and Kaifu in this 
regard is that Kaifu’s indecisiveness was fueled by a lack of consensus among the major 
newspapers.  In other words, he was allowing the editorials to influence his ability to 
make a decision.  On the other hand, Koizumi demonstrated that he would make 
decisions unencumbered of external factors when it came to major executive decisions 
such as the deployment of the SDF to support OEF and OIF.  This is not to say that he 
ignored public sentiment, but was aware of it and had a plan to assuage it if necessary. 
Another interesting point to consider when comparing Kaifu and Koizumi is the 
role that the dissolving of the Diet and calling for snap elections in the Lower House 
played.  Why did each man dissolve the Diet when he did?  Was the LDP in a position of 
strength when the Diet was dissolved?  What were the results and did each leader take 
advantage of a mandate, if it existed? 
Kaifu dissolved the Lower House in February 1990.  Unfortunately for Kaifu, he 
became prime minister in August 1989 and did not have the luxury of choosing an 
opportune time to dissolve the Diet because the four-year maximum time span between 
the elections in the Lower House was approaching.  Despite having this disadvantage, the 
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LDP did well and won 286 out of 512 seats.161  Based on the LDP’s success, one could 
argue that Kaifu had the mandate from the public to push through the electoral reform 
that he wanted to achieve.  After all, this was the playbook Koizumi used fifteen years 
later in pushing through his postal reform.  He dissolved the Diet, won decisively and 
used this mandate to achieve his goals.  
According to Gaunder, the LDP’s victory in the Lower House elections in 1990 
had the opposite effect on the LDP that the 2005 Lower House elections had on it.  
Instead of showing the members of the Diet that the public wants and expects the 
politicians to clean up the government in the wake of the Recruit scandal, the LDP 
members interpreted the election victory as the public has forgiven and is no longer upset 
with the LDP.  Although Kaifu was still interested in electoral reform, he was unable to 
secure a commitment from any faction leader.  In this particular situation, cautionary 
approaches led to complacency and as a result, Kaifu lost his “window of opportunity for 
electoral reform.”162 
This reinforces the idea that Kaifu did not see the urgency of the situation and let 
too much time slip between the election victory and his attempt to reengage his party for 
electoral reform.  Although the election was held in February 1990, Kaifu did not actively 
pursue electoral reform until April and did not meet with the faction leaders until May.  
He allowed three months to lapse before he visited faction leaders to demand their 
support for electoral reform.  Whether Kaifu believed it or not, there is little doubt that by 
allowing three months to pass prior to engaging faction heads face-to-face, Kaifu allowed 
a perception to exist that characterized electoral reform as a non-urgent and low priority 
issue.  By not rigorously pursuing the matter immediately following the election, the 
prime minister lost his opportunity and virtually guaranteed the demise of his 
administration months before it actually occurred. 
Furthermore, this lack of urgency was demonstrated by how Kaifu approached 
getting the reform bill through the Diet.  According to Gaunder, rather than working the 
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opposition to try to gain their support or by attempting to gain the support of the public as 
Koizumi did, he simply utilized the normal policy-making channels.163  Kaifu decided to 
use this approach because he believed that this was the best way to achieve consensus 
and try to get the opposition to support him.  This process proved to be too time-
consuming and by the time the bill was officially submitted to the Diet in 1991, both the 
sense of urgency and the window of opportunity evaporated. 
Clearly, Kaifu’s lack of urgency and inability to see and to take advantage of a 
window of opportunity in the domestic forum parallels his approach to foreign policy.  
There is a direct correlation.  Leadership is leadership and this case proves that it takes 
the same set of skills to succeed in both domestic and international politics. 
B. KOIZUMI’S DOMESTIC REFORMS 
There is little doubt that Prime Minister Koizumi demonstrated strong leadership, 
learned from the mistakes of his predecessors, and further normalized Japan’s security 
policy and international contributions far more than his predecessors or successors since.  
This section will provide the lesson that Koizumi demonstrated the strong leadership 
necessary to succeed in both domestic and international politics.  It will address his 
specific actions and personal attributes that made his policies a success. 
1. Postal Reform 
Fujimura examined the relationship between the prime minister and the ruling 
party legislators by studying the postal service privatization of 2005.164  He argues that 
when a prime minister is willing to risk his job for reform, he will more than likely 
increase his leverage to control the party leaders.  Essentially, Koizumi chose postal 
privatization as an issue more important than his job and was willing to take the risk in 
order to accomplish his goal.  Unwillingness to take risks was identified by Gaunder as 
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one of the main reasons why Kaifu failed to perform as prime minister.  Koizumi had 
many strong points, but his willingness to take risks was perhaps the most important 
personal attribute that he demonstrated as prime minister. 
Postal reform had great importance for Koizumi long before he became prime 
minister.  This, along with national finance issues, was what he had built his career as a 
politician around.165  He was elected to the LDP’s presidency on his third attempt in 
April 2001 and subsequently became the prime minister.  The first postal privatization 
reform bill of 2002 did not achieve the results that Koizumi had intended.  He was forced 
to negotiate and compromise on a large portion of the bill with other parties in order to 
get the bill to pass in the Diet.  This resulted in a watered-down version of the bill which 
was generally regarded as a failure for Koizumi.166 
Koizumi did not give up and accept this bill as a final product.  Demonstrating a 
strong commitment to the reform he believed in, he vowed to push through a more 
complete postal reform bill to the Diet by fiscal year 2005.  The 2005 version of the bill 
proposed dividing Japan Post into four branches focusing on different services such as 
banking and insurance.167  When this was not accepted by the LDP as a whole, Koizumi 
demonstrated his dissatisfaction to his party by reshuffling his cabinet and appointing 
only pro-reformers to his cabinet.  The bill narrowly passed in the Lower House but 37 
LDP members opposed Koizumi and voted against the bill.  When the bill was defeated 
in the Upper House, Koizumi dissolved the Lower House and called for a snap election.  
One of the powers Koizumi exercised as prime minister was to withhold endorsements 
for the 37 LDP members who voted against him and ran his own candidates, widely 
publicized in the media as Koizumi’s “assassins.”  Although 18 of the 37 managed to 
regain their seats in the election, Koizumi accomplished in sending a clear and strong 
signal to all LDP members to take his threats seriously and to think twice before voting 
against him. 
                                                 
165 Fujimura, “The Power Relationship between the Prime Minister and Ruling Party Legislators: The 
Postal Service Privatization Act of 2005 in Japan,” 235. 
166  Gaunder, Political Reform in Japan : Leadership Looming Large, 129. 
167  Ibid., 129. 
 74
Why did Koizumi succeed with his postal reform?  In addition to his willingness 
to take risks, Gaunder also argues that Koizumi displayed the necessary vision and the 
commitment to reform that Kaifu failed to demonstrate.  She also acknowledges 
Koizumi’s media savvy and excellent public speaking skills.  He also used his “window 
of opportunity” to close the deal immediately before the LDP had a chance to become 
complacent from the Lower House electoral victory as in Kaifu’s situation.  Koizumi 
forced the Diet to pass the postal reform bill while the election victory was still fresh on 
the minds of the politicians as well as the public.  The bill passed both Houses and 
became law one month after the Lower House victory. 
2. Link Between Domestic Performance and Foreign Affairs? 
Prime Minister Koizumi was Japan’s third longest serving postwar prime 
minister.  This fact alone is a remarkable achievement when one considers how “nasty, 
brutish and short”168 a typical term as the head of government for the world’s second 
largest economy normally is.  As was mentioned earlier in this thesis, the average length 
of an administration in the postwar years has been about two years.  Koizumi’s tenure 
lasted five and a half years.  In any case, Koizumi’s longevity as prime minister had more 
to do with his success in domestic politics than his foreign policy views. 
Is there a link between Koizumi’s success in domestic politics and his success on 
the international stage?  Clearly, the answer is yes.  Koizumi’s success in domestic 
politics provided him with the political capital necessary to succeed in international 
politics.  Vision is important.  One must understand what the goal is in order to achieve 
that goal, whether it is postal reform or the first war-time deployment of the SDF 
overseas since the end of the Pacific War.  Commitment is also important.  If one is not 
strongly committed to his vision, it would be very easy to not see it through to the end 
and simply give up at the first sign of difficulty.  The personal attribute that distinguishes 
Koizumi from the majority of his predecessors is his willingness to take risks; his 
willingness to place his job on the line to do what he believes is the right thing to do for 
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the country.  Similar to the way Senator McCain said that he would rather lose an 
election than to lose a war, Koizumi essentially told the LDP he would rather lose the 
election and his job than to lose on the postal privatization bill. 
C. PERFORMANCE OF POST-KOIZUMI PRIME MINISTERS 
Koizumi’s tenure as prime minister came to an end in September 2006.  Since his 
departure, three men have held the position; Shinzo Abe, Yasuo Fukuda, and Taro Aso.  
Abe and Fukuda each held for the position for less than one year and Aso is only two 
months into his premiership at the time of this writing.  Aso’s short period in office is not 
sufficient to analyze his performance thus far.  This section will, therefore, focus on the 
leadership of Abe and Fukuda to the provide the lessons learned as to what factors led to 
the relative ineffectiveness of their respective administrations and why they were unable 
to achieve success in the same post-electoral and cabinet reform era of the strongest 
postwar kantei. 
It is not the intent of this section to closely scrutinize the actions of Abe or 
Fukuda.  It is the intent of this brief section to simply address the point that despite the 
institutional improvements in the office of the prime minister and the kantei, without the 
right leader at the helm to take advantages of the tools that are available to him, the 
improvements are meaningless.  In other words, institutional factors alone do not 
automatically make a prime minister stronger. 
1. Abe 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came into office as the handpicked successor to 
Koizumi.  He developed a reputation as a strong leader even before becoming prime 
minister due to his actions as chief cabinet secretary under Koizumi in dealing with North 
Korea on nuclear as well as abduction issues.  He immediately visited China and South 
Korea after taking office to attempt to improve relations that deteriorated during the 
Koizumi years because of the Yasukuni visits. 
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Unfortunately for Abe and the country, his reputation as a strong leader would not 
last very long.  While a variety of factors likely led to his premature downfall, some 
appear to be major contributing factors, such as the return to a more consensual style of 
politics, his selection of cabinet ministers based on factional loyalties, his “flip-flopping” 
over the return of former LDP members ousted by Koizumi for voting against him in the 
postal privatization bill, his aggressive insistence on constitutional reform without a clear 
vision as to the outcome he wanted to achieve, among others.169  In other words, Abe 
displayed the kind of leadership, or lack thereof, which was the direct opposite of the 
type of personal attributes that Koizumi displayed during his successful tenure.  The 
consensual, non-confrontational style of politics had long been practiced before Koizumi 
and was among the main reasons why the Japanese prime minister was viewed as a weak 
leader whose job was to herd cats rather than actually lead.  His power base was weak to 
begin with because he chose cabinet ministers who helped him achieve victory for the 
LDP presidential race.170  As a result, he had ministers who were largely incompetent 
and prone to infighting.171  He failed to use the tools provided to him by the reforms from 
the Nineties such as the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (CEFP) which Koizumi 
had used to his advantage by driving policy from his cabinet.172 
Abe’s cabinet choices demonstrated his lack of judgment.  Another bit of 
evidence to support Abe’s lack of judgment was his inability to gauge the pulse of the 
Japanese people.  This attribute in particular was among Koizumi’s strongest.  Abe failed 
to see that the public was not strongly interested in the idea of constitutional revision.  
Yet, Abe made constitutional revision one of his main areas to focus his administration 
on.173  His decision to reinstate the members expelled by Koizumi was unpopular with 
the public and reinforced Abe’s image as a non-reformer (at least on domestic issues that 
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count).174  A leader who is not committed to reform is on dangerous ground when one 
considers the 2005 electoral victory was an affirmation by the public that they want 
reform. 
Although Abe was younger than Koizumi and had the looks worthy of a fresh and 
energetic leader for Japan, he clearly lacked Koizumi’s charisma and public speaking 
skills.  He was unable to capitalize on his relative youth due to all the factors previously 
mentioned.  Ultimately, the support ratings for his cabinet fell like a rock and even his 
last ditch effort to regain support for his cabinet by reshuffling its members could not 
overcome the fatal tail spin that his administration had gotten itself into.  After the LDP 
lost its majority in the Upper House, Abe abruptly resigned as prime minister only a year 
after succeeding Koizumi. 
2. Fukuda 
Following Abe’s resignation, Koizumi’s chief cabinet secretary prior to Abe, 
Yasuo Fukuda was elected as the next president of the LDP and by extension, Japan’s 
next prime minister.  Like Koizumi and Abe, Fukuda also comes from a political family.  
His father, Takeo Fukuda, served as prime minister from December 1976 to December 
1978.175  Fukuda, like Abe, showed a great deal of potential for the job due to his success 
as Koizumi’s CCS, especially during the initial phases of GWOT and OIF.  And 
ultimately, like Abe, his tenure as prime minister was to be “brutish, nasty and short.”  
Why did Fukuda fail to effectively carry out the duties of his office despite having the 
same institutional powers that Koizumi enjoyed? 
By now, it should not be surprising to see a similar pattern for the unsuccessful 
leaders.  The Japanese citizens have made it clear that they are not satisfied with business 
as usual and want leaders who will challenge the status quo and advance reforms to 
continuously seek improvements within the government and society.  Some of the 
qualities that Gaunder suggests as the reason for Kaifu’s downfall are also evident in 
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Fukuda’s downfall.  For example, he did not do a good job of articulating exactly what 
principles he stood for to the public.176  He was not very clear as to what programs and 
policies he wanted to reform.  Although Fukuda supporters could argue that he focused 
on reforming “consumer administration and improving the preservation of official 
documents,” the public by and large did not know what he really stood for.177  In short, 
from the public’s perspective, the only one that counts for a politician, he was viewed as 
a leader with a lack of vision. 
Since he was perceived to not have a vision, naturally, he also presented an image 
of not being committed to reform.178  When one is dealing with a major domestic crisis 
with the missing pension payment records for over 50 million Japanese citizens,179 the 
last thing in the world a politician needs is an image as non-reformer.  This is nearly 40 
percent of the Japanese population.  Imagine if the Social Security Administration lost the 
records for 40 percent of the American population and stopped sending out social 
security checks.  Clearly, the situation was not Fukuda’s fault; however, he must at the 
very least have appeared to be vigorously fighting for the people, and Fukuda simply did 
not have the charisma, energy or personality to present this image.  Additionally, he 
demonstrated that he was not interested in reform when he reshuffled his cabinet in the 
face of falling cabinet approval ratings and replaced proven reformers in his cabinet with 
anti-reformers, including those who opposed Koizumi’s postal privatization reforms.180 
Ironically, a contributor to Abe’s downfall was his reinstatement of the politicians 
into the LDP that Koizumi had kicked out of the party.  This proved to be a very 
unpopular decision with the public.  Fukuda’s subsequent decision to place some of these 
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individuals into his cabinet shows a severe lack of judgment on his part and demonstrates 
a lack of commitment to reform from the public’s perspective. 
What is abundantly clear is that the two men who successfully served as 
Koizumi’s chief cabinet secretary and right hand man did not follow the leadership 
example set by one of the most successful postwar prime ministers in Japan’s history. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. LEADERSHIP MATTERS: HOW WAS KOIZUMI DIFFERENT? 
The evidence provided in this thesis leads to a clear conclusion: individual 
leadership matters in Japan as much as it does anywhere else in the world.  Just as there 
are checks and balances built into the presidential system to limit the power of the 
executive in the United States, there are many constraints that limit a Japanese prime 
minister’s ability to be an effective executive.  The best postwar prime ministers of Japan 
demonstrated their ability to circumvent these constraints.181  Those who failed to learn 
how to circumvent these constraints did not remain prime minster for very long. 
According to Samuels, leadership “is that constrained place where the 
imagination, resources, and opportunities converge.”182  Gaunder calls imagination 
vision.  Koizumi clearly articulated his vision, whether domestically through his promise 
to reform the postal system or internationally through his promise to George Bush that 
Japan would provide more than just money for the war against terror.  Resources 
correlate to institutional factors such as the electoral reforms that decreased the power of 
the factions and the improvements to the cabinet to increase the strength of the kantei.  
Koizumi clearly took advantage of these changes by appointing cabinet members of his 
own choosing with no regard to factional loyalties and making policy from the top-down 
through the CEFP.  Gaunder refers to “opportunities” as windows of opportunity and this 
thesis describes it as situational factors.  Once again, Koizumi demonstrated strong 
leadership by taking advantage of these windows of opportunity to push through his 
agenda.  He demonstrated understanding that time was of the essence and if he waited too 
long, the window would abruptly close before he had a chance to push his agenda.  
Specifically, he rapidly pushed through the ATSML and the ISML to ensure Japanese 
participation in OEF and OIF.  Less successful leaders repeatedly wait too long and miss 
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out on their window of opportunity.  Koizumi consistently demonstrated that he was 
well-prepared and had a plan ready to submit at a moment’s notice when an opportunity 
presented itself. 
Koizumi’s willingness to take risks placed him in a league of his own in 
contemporary Japanese politics.  He was willing to place his job on the line in order to 
achieve results.  He was willing to take on the opposition, the special interest groups, and 
his own party.  He was able to do this because of his popularity.  His popularity was 
arguably his most important political capital.  Without it, it is doubtful that he would have 
been a successful reformer.  However, his popularity was not a given.  He had to invest a 
great deal of time and effort into building a positive image with the public through the 
media by providing more accessibility than previous prime ministers.  Unlike his 
predecessors, he communicated with the public in a manner easily understood by the 
average citizen.  Whether they disagreed with him or not, the public always knew exactly 
where Koizumi stood and there was little doubt that he always had Japan’s best interests 
in mind rather than himself or the LDP. 
B. THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN JAPAN 
The future success of Japanese prime ministers through demonstration of strong 
leadership in the new and improved kantei is not a foregone conclusion.  Prime Minister 
Koizumi’s successors thus far demonstrate this fact very clearly.  Abe and Fukuda had 
more in common with pre-Koizumi prime ministers than with Koizumi despite having 
major roles as CCS in the Koizumi administration. 
Despite Koizumi’s success and the precedent he set in favor of strong political 
leadership to further normalize Japan’s security policy, Abe’s attempts to make 
constitutional revision an issue contributed to a premature end of his premiership.  This 
was because he did not have the support of the public.  Public support is the most 
important political capital in order to be a successful prime minister.  He failed to gauge 
the pulse of the public and did not have a sense of timing necessary to advance major 
reforms. 
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If future prime ministers of Japan hope to replicate Koizumi’s successful tenure as 
prime minister rather than become the “one hit” or “no hit” wonders that seem to 
populate the list of Japanese prime ministers, they must be willing to take risks, 
demonstrate that they have a vision, demonstrate commitment, and strive to become 
popular to put political capital in their bank.  Popularity with the public is important if a 
leader expects to push policies that are not popular with the factional leadership as well 
as the rank and file members of Diet.  Unfortunately for Japanese politics, future 
prospects for Koizumi-esque leadership appear to be the exception rather than the rule. 
C. WHY IT MATTERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.-JAPAN 
ALLIANCE 
Some historians have argued that the allied cooperation during the Second World 
War between the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union was not a relationship 
between three countries but rather three men: Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin.  When 
there is a strong personal connection between the leaders of two or more nation-states, 
inevitably, the relationship between the nations will become one characterizing 
cooperation and trust.  One need not look further than the Bush-Blair relationship and the 
Bush-Koizumi relationship to understand this concept. 
The point to take away from this thesis is that Japan’s leadership is very important 
from the American perspective just as American leadership is important from the 
Japanese perspective.  It is no surprise that the Japanese press kept a close eye on the 
recent U.S. presidential election to try to analyze the future direction of the U.S.-Japan 
alliance.  Likewise, Americans must pay close attention to who leads the world’s second 
largest economy and America’s number one ally and best friend in Asia.  After all, the 
U.S.-Japan alliance is without question the linchpin of Washington’s security strategy in 
Asia.  Will the alliance benefit from a Koizumi-like leader who delivers on his promises 
to assist the United States during times of crises or from a leader who cannot gain a 
sufficient number of votes necessary to extend the MSDF’s refueling mission to support 
the war against terror?  The answer is obvious. 
 84
Although U.S.-Japan alliance scholars and policymakers do not have any input 
into who becomes the prime minister in Japan, it is nevertheless important to understand 
that the leader can and does make a difference.  It is also important to understand that the 
argument that the institutional changes have made the kantei more presidential or 
Westminster like is inaccurate.  This thesis clearly proves that a strong and effective 
prime minister like Koizumi is not a given.  Clearly, he is the exception and not the rule.  
It is also important to understand what that leader can and cannot do based on factors 
such as his popularity, power base within his own party, how he interacts with the 
opposition, and how he interacts with his bureaucrats because all of these factors will 
have an effect on what kind of a partner he will be to the United States. 
In conclusion, there are many constraints limiting what a Japanese prime minister 
can and cannot do, and there are additional factors that compete with the prime minister 
in setting policy, but it takes strong leadership from the prime minister to really make a 
difference.  When Japan needed to act immediately and decisively to maintain its 
credibility and status as the world’s second largest economy, Prime Minister Koizumi 
took action to ensure Japan contributed to the international community commensurate 
with Japan’s stature.  He did not let the citizens of Japan down, and he did not let the 
international community down.  Despite institutional improvements to the kantei, a 
relatively strong bureaucracy, and convenient windows of opportunity, leadership still 
matters in Japanese politics.  Simply put, the prime minister will make a difference 
between a Japan that contributes to international affairs appropriately and a Japan that 
fails to act. 
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